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1. Abstract 
 
Employee ownership describes the situation where employees own an equity stake in an 
employing organisation. Psychologists have found that employee ownership positively relates to 
several attitudes that contribute to organisational effectiveness, including: Organisational 
Commitment, Job Satisfaction, Organisational Justice, and Psychological Ownership. Contrarily, 
economists point out that employee owned firms exhibit reduced value maximisation compared 
to investor owned firms, and suggest that employee influence in decision making produces 
suboptimal outcomes. This thesis investigated whether the psychological effects related to 
employee ownership are affected by the level of employee control over the organisation. 
Experiment 1 investigated if individuals display differing preferences for three factors related to 
formal and psychological ownership: equity, control, and information, and it was found that 
greater levels of each factor were preferred. Experiment 2 investigated which of two types of 
control, operational control or governance control, were preferred for different employee 
ownership conditions. Higher levels of control were preferred in all cases with governance 
control preferred overall. Experiment 3 investigated if the preference for governance or 
operational control changed as the at-risk component of employee remuneration changed. As at-
risk remuneration increased, greater levels of control were preferred, and perceptions of 
organisational justice decreased. Overall it appeared that full organisational control produces the 
best outcomes in terms of organisational commitment, satisfaction, organisational justice, and 
psychological ownership, although acceptable outcomes are still possible with decreased levels 
of control. 
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2. Introduction 
 
Employee ownership describes an employment relationship where the employee has an 
ownership stake in the employing organisation. This differs from the more prevalent form of 
employment relationship where the organisation is owned by investors and employees are hired 
for their labour. Two common types of employee ownership are worker cooperatives and 
employee share ownership schemes. 
 In Worker Cooperatives members of the cooperative (employees) collectively own the 
organisation. The size of the ownership stake held by each member may vary; usually no 
external parties will own a stake in the organisation; and members contribute to decision making 
with a one person-one vote system (Dow, 2003; Hansmann, 1996; Kruse & Blasi, 1998). Worker 
cooperatives occur predominately in small- to medium-sized firms, with the plywood 
manufacturing cooperatives in the United States and Mondragon enterprises of Spain being 
notable examples (Dow, 2003; Kruse & Blasi, 1998). 
Employee share ownership has become the predominant form of employee ownership 
and has attracted much research interest. It will be the type of employee ownership investigated 
in this study. 
Employee share ownership is an employment arrangement where individual employees 
own a number of shares in their employing organisation. Employees will own shares either 
directly or indirectly through a trust, usually in combination with external share owning 
investors who will also own a significant number of shares (Kruse & Blasi, 1998). Typically in 
this form of employee ownership there will be a definite separation in roles between workers, 
managers, and investors; the quantity of shares will not necessarily be distributed equally among 
shareholders and a significant proportion of employees will own shares (Pierce, Rubenfeld, & 
Morgan, 1991). 
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An example is the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) system used in the United 
States. ESOPs were legally recognised and granted special tax treatment as a form of pension 
plan in 1974 by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (Kruse & Blasi, 1998; 
Logue & Yates, 2000). An ESOP must invest primarily in own-company shares. A company 
with an ESOP will make tax deductible contributions or use cash to purchase company shares, 
which are held in trust on behalf of member employees (Culpepper & Gamble, 2004). The tax 
deductibility of the contributions makes it financially attractive for companies to operate ESOPs 
(Kruse & Blasi, 1998). The employee member receives the value of their share allocation on 
retirement or on leaving the firm, so long as any necessary vesting requirements particular to the 
company have been fulfilled (Kruse & Blasi, 1998). The voting rights associated with the shares 
may be held by the trustee or passed onto the member employees (Kruse & Blasi, 1998). 
Another example of employee share ownership is the Employee Stock Purchase Plan 
(ESPP). Here employees purchase company shares outright, and gain a direct ownership stake in 
the employing organisation which includes the voting rights associated with share ownership 
(Kruse & Blasi, 1998). Employee-owners may be co-owners with outside investors who are not 
involved in the daily operations of the organisation. Shares may be offered to employees at a 
discount of up to 15% to provide the incentive of a financial benefit to encourage uptake by 
employees (Farmer & Geisler, 2007).  
There has been substantial growth in the prevalence of employee share ownership in the 
United States since the mid 1970s where it has become the predominant form of employee 
ownership. In the United States, employee share ownership in the form of ESOPs, share bonus 
schemes, and profit sharing plans investing primarily in employer shares, have grown in number 
from 1,600 in 1975, to 11,400 in 2009 (NCEO, 2010). In 2006 in the U.S. there were an 
estimated 13.7 million individuals participating in employee ownership with estimated assets of 
U.S. $925 billion dollars (NCEO, 2010).  
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The growth of ESOPs, and employee ownership more generally, has attracted 
considerable attention from business, public policy, labour, and academic groups (Kruse & 
Blasi, 1998). Interest in employee ownership has focused on the hopes that it has the potential to 
broaden wealth distribution; and to improve economic performance of organisations through 
improvement in employee attitudes, behaviours, and improved worker-management cooperation 
(Kruse & Blasi, 1998; Pierce & Rodgers, 2004; Poutsma, de Nijs, & Poole, 2003). A survey 
undertaken in the United States in 1986 outlined reasons why ESOPs were formed by 
companies, 91% to provide an employee benefit, 70% to improve productivity, 36% to reduce 
turnover, 32% to transfer ownership to employees, and 24% to raise capital for investment 
(Kruse & Blasi, 1998).   
Since the mid 1970s there have been a large number of empirical studies on employee 
ownership that have attempted to define and explain the effects it has in organisations (Pierce & 
Rodgers, 2004). Various disciplines have taken an interest in employee ownership: economics, 
accounting, law, organisational behaviour, and psychology (Pierce & Rodgers, 2004). The 
dominant pattern of thought is that employee ownership should improve organisational 
performance, although there are economic models that hypothesise negative performance effects. 
Economic and macro-organisational behaviour research has attempted to determine whether 
employee owned organisations are more productive than non-employee owned ones in terms of 
investment and financial incentives, whereas psychology and micro-organisational behaviour 
research have investigated the attitudinal and behavioural effects on individuals due to employee 
ownership (Pierce & Rodgers, 2004).  
2.1 Psychological Ownership 
 Perhaps the most obvious effect of employee ownership is that employees will come to 
see themselves as owners of the organisation. Pierce and Rodgers (2004) proposed a model of 
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the psychology of employee ownership that described ownership existing as separate objective 
(formal) and psychological states.  
Formal ownership is represented by the financial equity an employee owns in the 
organisation (Pierce & Rodgers, 2004; Wagner, Parker, Christiansen, 2003). From a legal 
perspective formal ownership is accompanied by three fundamental rights: Equity, a right to the 
object’s physical being and financial value; Information, a right to information about the objects 
status; and Control, the right to exercise influence over the object (Pierce & Rodgers, 2004; 
Pierce et al. 1991).   
The concept of psychological ownership was introduced by Pierce, Rubenfeld, and 
Morgan (1991) who proposed that formal ownership by an individual may encourage the 
development of a psychological sense of ownership over the organisation. Pierce et al. (1991) 
proposed that psychological ownership would help to explain attitudinal and behavioural effects 
arising from employee ownership of the organisation. 
Psychological ownership can be described as a state of mind in which a person has 
feelings of possessiveness and of being psychologically tied to the target of ownership (Pierce et 
al., 1991), and where the individual feels the target or a piece of it is “theirs” (Pierce, Kostova, & 
Dirks, 2003). Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks (2001) offered an explanation as to how individuals 
develop feelings of ownership and identified three mechanisms or “routes” through which 
psychological ownership emerges in individuals.  
(1) Controlling the target. Research has shown that control exercised over a particular 
target will result in feelings of ownership for that target. Organisations give members the 
opportunity to exercise varying degrees of control over various factors which may become the 
target of psychological ownership. The more control the stronger the feelings of ownership over 
the target. For example, autonomous job designs enable more control over jobs and produce 
stronger feelings of psychological ownership, whereas centralised hierarchical job designs limit 
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individual control over jobs producing weaker feelings of ownership (Pierce et al., 2001; Pierce 
et al., 2003).  
 (2) Intimate knowledge of the target. The more information and knowledge an individual 
has about a target the stronger their association with it and the stronger their feelings of 
ownership over it (Pierce et al., 2001; Pierce et al., 2003). Organisations provide members with 
the opportunity to gain knowledge of various targets through association and information about 
them, such as the organisation mission, its goals, and performance (Pierce et al., 2001; Pierce et 
al., 2003). The better members feel they know an organisation the stronger their feelings of 
ownership. 
 (3) Investing the self in the target. The investment of self through investment of time and 
effort into the target causes the self to feel as one with, and to develop feelings of ownership 
over the target. Organisations provide their members with the opportunities to invest themselves 
into facets such as jobs, products, and customers, and therefore experience feelings of ownership 
over these facets (Pierce et al., 2001; Pierce et al., 2003). Likewise having responsibility for a 
target is also likely to result in psychological ownership. If an individual feels responsible for a 
target then they will invest time and energy to ensure its well being and develop a sense 
psychological ownership for it (Pierce et al., 2003). 
Psychological ownership can be organisation-based or job-based (Mayhew, Ashkanasy, 
Bramble, & Gardiner, 2007). Organisation-based psychological ownership is an individual’s 
feelings of possession and relatedness to the organisation as a whole, whereas job-based 
psychological ownership is an individual’s feelings of possession over their job exclusively. 
Both are attitudinal states, rather than enduring personality traits, and therefore context specific 
being influenced by the current state of the organisation and job (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). 
Mayhew et al. (2007) found that organisation-based and job-based psychological ownership 
were distinct work based attitudes differentiable form one another. 
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Pierce et al. (2001) hypothesised that organisation-based psychological ownership was 
more likely to arise when the features of the formal ownership arrangement in an organisation 
enabled the developmental mechanisms necessary for psychological ownership to be realised 
(investing self in target, knowing the target, and controlling the target). The three fundamental 
legal rights that define ownership (equity, information, and control) parallel the mechanisms 
proposed by Pierce et al. (2001) that bring about psychological ownership (Pierce & Rodgers, 
2004). Pierce and Rodgers (2004) proposed that employee ownership systems designed to 
provide the legal rights of ownership will provide the necessary conditions for psychological 
ownership to emerge, thus linking formal and psychological ownership. 
Pierce and Rodgers (2004) proposed a process of how psychological ownership may 
positively affect employee attitudes and behaviours and provide motivation for the employee-
owner to contribute to the wellbeing of the organisation. By extending the opportunity of 
organisational ownership to employees, sharing organisational information, and permitting 
employee involvement in decision making, the employer communicates a message to the 
employee that he or she is valued and important to the organisation. As employees internalise the 
belief that they are competent, important, and valuable to the organisation they will be motivated 
to work hard to maintain that self image. Similarly, as employees come to increasingly 
experience a sense of ownership over the organisation, the organisation becomes a part of the 
employee owner’s extended sense of self. The self regulatory mechanisms of self-efficacy and 
self-enhancement provide the performance motivation to maintain or enhance that self image 
which includes the organisation (Pierce and Rodgers, 2004). Summed up as, “It is when the 
owned object is a part of the self and the self is motivated to maintain or enhance the sense of 
self that employee owners are motivated to improve organisational performance and ensure the 
vitality of the organisation” (Pierce and Rodgers, 2004, p. 606).  
 
8 
 
2.2 Organisational Commitment 
Several organisational attitudes and performance behaviours relate to psychological 
ownership (Mayhew et al., 2007). Two specific attitudes are Organisational Commitment and 
Job Satisfaction (Mayhew et al., 2007). Commitment and satisfaction represent evaluative 
tendencies toward a target, and have been found to be distinct from psychological ownership 
which represents a sense of possession of a target (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004; Wagner, Parker, & 
Christiansen, 2003). There is however a demonstrable positive relationship between the 
constructs; as an individual’s level of psychological ownership increases so do the levels of 
organisational commitment and job satisfaction experienced (Mayhew et al., 2007). 
 Organisational commitment is described by Meyer and Allen (1991) as a desire to 
maintain an association with an organisation. In their three-component conceptualisation of 
organisational commitment Meyer and Allen (1991) describe it as having separate affective, 
normative, and continuance components. Affective commitment is the employee’s emotional 
attachment to, identification with, and involvement in an organisation (Meyer & Allen, 1991). 
By definition it would be expected that affective commitment would be closely related to 
psychological ownership (Mayhew et al., 2007), and several researchers have reported empirical 
evidence that supports a positive relationship between the two (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004; 
Vandewalle, Van Dyne, & Kostova, 1995). Avey, Avolio, Crossley, and Luthans (2009) found a 
correlation of r = .48 between psychological ownership and affective commitment toward the 
organisation 
 According to Meyer and Herscovitch (2001) commitment binds an individual to a course 
of action relevant to a particular target. Individuals with strong affective commitment are likely 
to engage in behaviours that are beneficial to the target (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001).  When the 
target of commitment is an entity such as an organisation and the commitment experienced is 
affective commitment the resulting behaviours may be very general in scope (Meyer & 
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Herscovitch, 2001). Affective commitment correlates strongly with a range of outcomes such as: 
turnover, turnover intention, and absenteeism (all negatively); and job performance, and 
organisational citizenship behaviours (positively) (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001).  
2.3 Satisfaction 
General satisfaction was proposed by Van Dyne and Pierce (2004) to arise in individuals 
when they possess feelings of ownership for an organisation. General satisfaction levels are 
based on an evaluation of the overall work situation, whereas Job Satisfaction more specifically 
focuses on aspects of a particular job (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996; as cited in, Van Dyne & 
Pierce, 2004). Research into possession has demonstrated that individuals develop positive 
evaluations of their possessions, judging owned possession more favourably than those that are 
not owned. It follows that employees who have developed a sense of psychological ownership 
over an organisation will have higher levels of general satisfaction (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). 
And when an employee’s evaluation of an organisation is positive, by way of general 
satisfaction, this will increase job satisfaction (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). 
 Support for a relationship between psychological ownership and job satisfaction has been 
found in several studies (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004; Vandewalle, Van Dyne, & Kostova, 1995). 
Mayhew et al. (2007) found that organisation-based psychological ownership was related to job 
satisfaction and Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan (1991) found that job satisfaction was related to 
formal employee ownership dependent on individuals also developing psychological ownership. 
Avey et al. (2009) found a correlation of r = .49 between psychological ownership and job 
satisfaction. 
2.4 Organisational Justice 
Organisational Justice also relates to psychological ownership. Organisational justice 
describes the perceived fairness of treatment received from an organisation by both individuals 
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and by groups (Aryee, Budhwar & Chen, 2002). Organisational justice consists of 3 dimensions: 
Distributive justice − the perceived fairness of allocation decisions; Procedural justice − the 
perceived fairness of the organisational process used to make decisions; and Interactional justice 
−the perceived quality of interactions between individuals and decision makers (Aryee, et al. 
2002; Patterson, Green & Cary, 2002). 
Chi and Han (2008) proposed that organisational justice acts as a mediating variable 
between formal ownership and psychological ownership. Justice perceptions are positively 
related to organisational practises such as profit sharing, participation in decision making, and 
information sharing (Aryee, Chen, & Budhwar, 2004). Justice perceptions in turn influence 
employee attitudes toward the organisation (Aryee et al., 2004). Chi and Han (2008) noted that 
the three rights associated with formal ownership (equity, control, and information), are similar 
to the practises that have proven to be related to the development of distributive and procedural 
justice (profit sharing, participation in decision making, and information sharing), which in turn 
are similar to the three routes to psychological ownership described by Pierce et al. (2001) 
(controlling target, knowledge of target, and investment of self). Chi and Han (2008) then 
reasoned that formal ownership should lead to higher levels of perceived justice, resulting in 
higher levels of positive affect and psychological ownership for the organisation. 
Distributional justice mediates the relationship between the equity right and 
psychological ownership (Chi & Han, 2008). The equity right of formal ownership allows the 
employee a claim on the profits of the organisation (Kruse & Blasi, 1998). Distributional justice 
perceptions are based on the perceived fairness of allocation decisions (Aryee, et al. 2002; 
Patterson et al. 2002). Chi and Han (2008) proposed that if employees feel fairly treated after 
participating in profit sharing then they will feel a sense of distributional justice. Higher levels of 
perceived distributional justice will result in higher levels of psychological ownership and other 
organisational attitudes (Chi and Han, 2008). Chi and Han (2008) argued that an employee’s 
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distributive justice perceptions, based on the perceived fairness of the exchange of work effort 
for financial rewards, will mediate the relationship between employee profit sharing programs 
and psychological ownership for the organisation.  
Procedural justice mediates the relationship between the control right and psychological 
ownership (Chi and Han, 2008). Formal employee ownership may include the right to participate 
in organisational decision making (Rosseau & Shperling, 2003). Participation in organisational 
decision making allows employees to have a voice in the decision making process and allows 
them to directly influence decisions and outcomes (process and decision control). This 
participation gives employees control over procedures increasing procedural justice perceptions 
(Chi & Han, 2008). Pierce et al. (2001) stated that control exercised over a particular target will 
result in feelings of ownership over that object, and participation in organisational decision 
making by employees has been shown to increase levels of psychological ownership 
(O’Driscoll,  2006; Pierce et al., 2004). Chi and Han (2008) argued that the relationship between 
formal ownership and organisational ownership is mediated by an employee’s perceptions of 
procedural justice due to the opportunity to contribute to decision making in the organisation. 
Procedural justice mediates the relationship between the right to information and 
psychological ownership (Chi & Han, 2008). Formal ownership entails the right to provision of 
information on the state of the target (Pierce et al. 1991; Pierce & Rodgers, 2004). The more 
information and knowledge an individual possesses about a target the stronger their association 
with it and the stronger their feelings of ownership over it (Pierce et al. 2001). Shperling and 
Rouseau (2003) proposed that sharing business information can show a desire to promote a 
common frame of reference between managers and employees especially in decision making and 
that the extent to which employees are provided information on the business influences their 
feelings of organisational ownership. Pierce and Rodgers (2004) argued that access to 
organisational information positively influences employee’s feelings of ownership. Chi and Han 
12 
 
(2008) argued that these observations can be explained thus: provision of business information 
to employees contributes to perceptions of procedural justice which in turn promotes levels of 
psychological ownership. 
Chi and Han (2008) used Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) to test the linkages 
between the three rights of ownership (equity, control, and information) and psychological 
ownership, and examine the mediating roles of distributional and procedural justice. They tested 
both fully and partially mediated models of this relationship and found that procedural and 
distributive justice fully but differentially mediated that relationships between the three 
ownership rights and psychological ownership (Chi and Han, 2008). As one of the few studies to 
examine the relationship of justice and psychological ownership, Chi and Han (2008) also found 
a positive relationship between perceptions of distributive and procedural justice and 
psychological ownership. Together these findings add information as to how formal ownership 
contributes the emergence of psychological ownership (Chi & Han, 2008). 
2.5 Organisational Citizenship Behaviours 
 Attitudes such as commitment, satisfaction, and organisational justice are an important 
aspect of employee ownership because they relate to positive work behaviours (LePine, Erez, & 
Johnson, 2002; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004; Vandewalle, Van Dyne, & Kostova, 1995; Wagner et 
al., 2003). Positive work behaviours include Organisational Citizenship Behaviours (OCBs) 
which are discretionary work behaviours not a part of formal job expectations (LePine et al., 
2002). For example, helping co-workers, or volunteering for special tasks (Van Dyne & Pierce, 
2004). 
Psychological ownership influences levels of OCB (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004; 
Vandewalle et al., 1995; Wagner et al., 2003). Vandewalle et al. (1995) found that the 
relationship between psychological ownership and extra role behaviour was mediated by 
commitment and Van Dyne and Pierce (2004) found that psychological ownership increased the 
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explained variance in OCB above that explained by commitment, satisfaction, and demographic 
factors. This is an important finding that adds validity to the claim that psychological ownership 
is a construct that can help predict employee attitudes and work behaviours beyond that possible 
with commitment and satisfaction (Van Dyne and Pierce, 2004). 
2.6 Effectiveness of Employee Ownership 
Formal employee ownership is believed to integrate the goals of the employee with those 
of the organisation, promote employee control over the organisation, and promote the belief that 
employees have a vested interest in the success of the organisation (Wagner et al., 2003). It has 
been proposed that aspects of these claims can be explained by the process described above, 
where a positive change in employee attitudes and behaviours occurs through the development 
of psychological ownership, related positive organisational attitudes, and resulting pro-
organisation behaviours such as OCBs. (Chi & Han, 2008; Mayhew et al., 2007; Pierce et al., 
1991; Pierce et al., 2001; Pierce et al., 2003; Pierce & Rodgers, 2004; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004; 
Wagner et al., 2003).  
At first sight then, employee ownership is all good. However the simple implementation 
of a formal employee ownership scheme does not guarantee a positive change in employee 
attitudes and behaviours, or result in automatic improvements in productivity or organisational 
performance (Blasi, Conte, & Kruse, 1996; Kruse & Blasi, 1998). 
 Kruse and Blasi (1998) compared the results of nine studies on the effects of ESOPs on 
organisation productivity and profitability. Only two studies clearly showed significant positive 
results at the 95 percent level of confidence, and the remaining seven showed positive trends but 
these were not significant (Kruse & Blasi, 1998). Kruse and Blasi (1998) estimated the 
productivity difference between ESOP and non-ESOP firms at 6.2 percent. Wagner et al. (2003) 
reported mixed findings on the relationship between employee ownership and organisational 
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financial performance with neutral to positive effects, as did Blasi, Conte, and Kruse (1996); 
Robinson and Wilson (2006). 
A more damning view of the results of employee ownership was provided by economic 
researchers Faleye, Mehrotra, and Morck (2005) in a study of the financial decision making in 
226 publicly traded firms with an employee ownership stake. They found that firms with an 
employee ownership stake compared to other firms: “deviate more from value maximisation, 
spend less on new capital, took fewer risks, grow more slowly, create fewer new jobs, and 
exhibit lower labor and total factor productivity” (Faleye et al., 2005, p. 3).  
Faleye et al. (2005) proposed that permitting employees a residual claim on the income 
of an organisation through share ownership is not an effective method of aligning investor and 
employee interests. Employees hold a fixed claim over a firm’s cash flows in the form of wages 
and salaries. Employee share ownership provides employees a residual claim and a voice in the 
governance of the company through the voting rights associated with their shares. Typically the 
returns that employee owners receive from their fixed claims on the company (wages or salaries) 
are far greater than those from their residual claims (dividends). Faleye et al. (2005) claim that 
strategies that lead to shareholder value maximisation are markedly different from those that 
maximise the combined value of employee fixed and variable claims; and that employees will 
use their governance rights to pursue strategies that maximise their combined returns and will be 
detrimental to shareholder value maximisation. Faleye et al. (2005) found that firms with 
employee share ownership do not maximise shareholder value. 
Several researchers have attributed poorer financial performance in employee owned 
organisations, such as that illustrated by Faleye et al. (2005), to problems arising from collective 
decision making (E.g.: Dow, 2003; Dow & Putterman, 1999; Hansmann, 1996). Employees are 
seen as having more heterogeneous preferences than investors. Investors are primarily interested 
in wealth maximisation, whereas employees hold differing preferences towards aspects of 
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organisational life such as: risks to income, job security, relative wage levels, and capital 
expenditure (Dow & Putterman, 1999; Hansmann, 1996). When employees are involved in 
managerial decision making these varied preferences cause the decision making process to be 
slow and result in ineffective decisions (Dow & Putterman, 1999). Conversely, in investor 
controlled firms investor’s homogeneous preference for wealth maximisation simplifies 
managerial decision making (Hansmann, 1996). Hansmann (1996) stated that the heterogeneous 
preferences of employees increase the transaction costs of managerial decision making in labour 
managed firms relative to those in investor controlled firms.  
Solutions suggested as a way to avoid the negative effects of heterogeneous preferences 
on organisational decision making follow a similar vein. Hansmann (1996) suggested that 
organisational institutions be created that effectively constrain the range of choices available. He 
mentions shared norms, limitations on voting procedures and outcomes, and reviews by outside 
agencies (Hansmann, 1996). Hansmann (1996) theorised that if employees are to be given an 
ownership stake in an organisation then it is most effective to structure the organisation as an 
entity that is managed on behalf of, not fully controlled by, its employee owners. Similarily, 
Morck (as cited in; Kwak, 2005) recommended that employee ownership be implemented in 
such a way that the voting rights associated with company shares are removed from employee 
control by holding the shares in a trust, or designing other methods of ownership to avoid 
problems of collective decision making. 
2.7 Implementation 
The extent to which employee ownership is successful in producing desirable outcomes, 
such as positive organisational attitudes and behaviours, is determined by how it is implemented 
(E.g. Kaarsemaker and Poutsma, 2006; O’Driscoll, Pierce, and Coghlan, 2006; Pierce, 
O’Driscoll, & Coghlan, 2004; Robinson & Wilson, 2006). Factors such as the history of 
employment relations, human resource policies, and management practises maintained by the 
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firm all influence the success of employee ownership (Culpepper et al., 2004; Kruse & Blasi, 
1998). And as Hansmann (1996) and Morck (as cited in; Kwak, 2005) have theorised, the 
ownership structure used to implement employee ownership will also affect the success of the 
employee owned organisation. 
Kaarsemaker and Poutsma (2006) investigated employee ownership from the perspective 
of Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM). SHRM is the area of Human Resource 
Management (HRM) that deals with the link between HRM activities, HRM outcomes (e.g. 
employee attitudes and behaviours), and organisation performance (Kaarsemaker & Poutsma, 
2006). Kaarsemaker and Poutsma (2006) were interested in what employee ownership 
contributes to the organisation as an HRM practise, and what conditions are necessary to obtain 
positive results. They concluded that for employee ownership to produce desirable positive 
outcomes two key factors must be present: First, the idea that employees deserve to be owners 
must be taken seriously and actively promoted within the organisation. Second, the HRM 
systems should mirror the rights that make up the construct of ownership: participation in 
decision making, profit sharing, and information sharing. Additionally, for information sharing 
to be effective employees must receive training in business literacy (Kaarsemaker & Poutsma, 
2006).  
2.8 Control 
Participating in decision making allows the employee-owner to exercise some control 
over the organisation. O’Driscoll et al. (2006) described how research into the individual-
organisation relationship has revealed that the employee’s affective, motivational, and 
behavioural responses are more positive when the work environment is characterised by low 
levels of structure and where there is the opportunity to exercise personal control.  
Pierce et al. (2004) highlighted the importance of the control dimension to development 
of psychological ownership in a study on the relationship between work environment structure, 
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the personal experiences of control that environment permits, and psychological ownership. 
They identified three sources of work environment structure that influence the amount of control 
an individual experiences as being: technology, job design, and the design of organisational 
decision making systems (O’Driscoll et al., 2006). 
 High levels of technological structure that are routine and system-controlled limit the 
amount of control experienced, whereas non-routine technologies that permit more flexible work 
practises are associated with greater levels of control (Pierce et al., 2004). Pierce et al. (2004) 
found a negative relationship between level of technological routine and employee perceived 
control.  
Autonomous job design allows employees the discretion to plan how they work. Pierce et 
al. (2004) proposed that highly autonomous job design provides a high level of perceived control 
and would be expected to increase experienced psychological ownership. A positive relationship 
between job autonomy and perceived control was observed by Pierce et al. (2004), and by 
Mayhew et al. (2007). 
The third source of work environment structure than can provide control to the employee 
is participation in decision making. Participative decision making shares authority allowing 
employees to contribute to the decision making process (Pierce et al., 2004). In typical 
hierarchical organisational decision making processes where goal setting, planning, operation, 
and human resource decisions are made by senior managers and passed down the hierarchy, little 
decisional control remains at the job level (Pierce at al., 2004). In comparison, participative 
management practises allow employee decisional input into issues relevant to the context of their 
jobs providing the job holder with greater control over the job (Pierce at al., 2004). Pierce et al. 
(2004) found a moderately strong relationship between supervisor ratings of employee 
participation in work related decision making and employee perceived levels of control.  
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Similarly, Wagner et al. (2003) found a moderate positive relationship between an 
organisational climate of self determinism and ownership beliefs. A climate of organisational 
self determination is defined as managerial support for employees initiating and regulating their 
own actions. In the workplace this is often promoted through participative management practises 
(Wagner et al., 2003). 
These findings show that the degree of control an employee experiences over issues 
relating to the context of their job increases their feelings of psychological ownership. Pierce et 
al. (2004) theorised that having control over higher order organisational processes such as 
strategic decision making and resource allocation would therefore have greater impact on 
feelings of organisational psychological ownership. If this proposition were found to be true, 
then Hansmann’s (1996) and Morck’s (as cited in; Kwak, 2005) recommendation to limit 
employee control in the interest of organisational financial performance would be faced with 
some strong theoretical resistance.  
Hansmann’s (1996) and Morck’s (as cited in; Kwak, 2005) recommendations were based 
on the argument that when employees are granted a stake in the control of an organisation, by 
way of an ownership stake and its associated voting rights, then they use this control to 
maximise the present value of their wage and benefits which is detrimental to overall 
shareholder wealth maximisation, as illustrated by Faleye et al. (2005). This argument is often 
stated in economic research into employee ownership as one of key the reasons why employee 
ownership is not more prevalent in the economy (Dow, 2003; Faleye et al., 2005; Hansmann, 
1996). From an economic stand point, the costs of employee ownership are too great rendering 
employee owned firms inefficient and less effective than investor owned firms. This stance 
maintained by economists is in direct contrast to the arguments put forward by psychology 
researchers who have found that formal ownership results in individual attitudes and behaviours 
which contribute to organisational effectiveness. 
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It may be possible to reconcile these two arguments if it were found that limiting 
employee control over an organisation does not impede the positive psychological effects of 
employee ownership. If this was found to be so, employee ownership could be implemented in 
such a way so that the scope of employee decision making was limited to issues surrounding the 
job context, and control over higher order strategic issues was maintained by senior management 
and investors. In an effort to investigate whether reconciliation is possible this study investigated 
how the level of control over an organisation affects employee preferences for employee 
ownership. This information will help determine whether the recommendation to limit the scope 
of the democratic participation of employees in employee owned organisations is feasible.  
Experiment 1 investigated whether individuals were able to differentiate between the 
three factors which specify the rights of formal ownership, and the necessary mechanisms to 
psychological ownership − equity, information, and control (see: Pierce & Rodgers, 2004; Pierce 
et al. 1991; Pierce et al., 2001). Experiment 2 investigating whether individuals have different 
preferences for operational control (job context) and governance control (higher order strategic) 
in employee ownership situations. This was done to determine if it would be possible to limit the 
scope of employee control as a way to avoid negative ramifications on organisational 
performance (see: Dow, 2003; Faleye et al., 2005; Hansmann, 1996), and still retain the positive 
psychological effects associated with employee control (1996; O’Driscoll et al., 2006, Pierce et 
al., 2004). Experiment 3 investigated the claim by Faleye et al., (2005) that employee owners use 
their governance rights (votes) to maximised the combined returns of their fixed and variable 
incomes. Typically the fixed returns employees receive from wages and salaries are greater than 
those variable returns they receive as equity holders, whereas investors receive only a variable 
return in the form of dividends. Experiment 3 investigated if individual preference for control 
differs as the variable portion of total income increases and comes to resemble an investor’s 
income from dividends. 
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3. Experiment 1 
 
 Pierce and Rodgers (2004) hypothesised that a formal ownership scheme structured 
around the rights of equity, control, and information would likely result in feelings of 
psychological ownership towards the organisation. Research has shown that psychological 
ownership is positively related to commitment, satisfaction, and justice (Avey et al., 2009; 
Mayhew et al., 2007; Chi & Han, 2008). Thus Experiment 1 sought to determine whether 
participants would differentiate between four employment scenarios that described different 
levels of equity, control, and information, and indicate a differing level of preference for each 
scenario. 
3.1 Method 
3.11 Participants 
 There were 19 male and 19 female participants. Ages ranged from 20 years to 59 years 
with a mean age of 31.6 (SD = 12.25) years. Participants were volunteers, recruited from the 
researcher’s social contacts. Each participant was tested independently. One questionnaire was 
excluded from the study as it was returned with an ambiguous response. 
 There were two groups used in the study. The first consisted of workers. There were 12 
male and 8 females in the worker group. Ages ranged from 23 to 59 years with a mean age of 
38.25 (SD = 12.9) years. The second group in the study were non-workers consisting mainly of 
students. There were 7 males and 11 females, ages ranged from 20 years to 44 years with a mean 
age of 24.2 (SD = 5.56) years.  
3.12 Design 
 The study was a 1-by-4 within-subjects design. Participants were exposed to four levels 
of the independent variable; scenarios 1 through 4: (1) Employment, (2) Share Trust, (3) 
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Representative Control, and (4) Direct Control. The presentation order of the scenarios was 
randomised.  There were 4 dependent measures, each representing a different construct: (1) 
organisational justice, (2) organisational commitment, (3) psychological ownership, and (4) 
satisfaction.   
3.13 Materials 
Printed questionnaires were used (Appendix B). Each questionnaire consisted of 4 
scenarios followed by four questions. Each scenario represented a particular type of employment 
situation.  
The scenarios were: (1) Employment scenario. As the control, the Employment scenario 
depicted a typical employment situation where employees did not have equity in the company, 
control over the company or information regarding the performance of the company. 
(2) Share Trust scenario. This scenario depicted an employee ownership arrangement 
where an allocation of company shares was held in trust for each employee. This is somewhat 
similar to an ESOP arrangement where voting rights are held by the trustee. Here employee-
owners had no control over the company through shares held in trust, nor information about the 
performance of the company, but did have an equity stake through direct claim on the value of 
the shares and dividends paid. 
 (3) Representative Control scenario. This scenario depicted an employee ownership 
arrangement where employees held shares personally, but as a group elected a representative to 
vote on company decisions on their behalf. Here employee-owners had representative control of 
the company, equity through claim on the value of the shares and dividends, and information 
regarding the performance of the company. 
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 (4) Direct Control scenario. This scenario depicted an employee ownership arrangement 
where individual employees held shares in the company and were accorded full share-holder 
rights over the shares, this is similar to an ESPP. Employee-owners had direct control over the 
company through full voting rights, equity through claim to the value of the shares and 
dividends, and full information regarding the performance of the company. 
The same four questions were asked after each scenario. Each question asked participants 
to consider the information provided in the scenario and to score the level of the particular 
dependent variable that they perceived. The questions concerned: (1) Justice,  “Considering the 
information given in the scenario above, how just, or fair, do you believe that this type of 
employment arrangement is to workers in the company?” (2) Commitment, “Considering the 
information given in the scenario above, how committed do you believe you would feel towards 
the company, its goals, and its ongoing success if you were a worker here?” (3) Ownership, 
“Considering the information given in the scenario above, how would you rate your belief that 
you personally owned some of this company, i.e. would you see yourself as an owner of the 
company?” (4) Satisfaction, “How satisfactory would you find the employment situation 
described in the scenario above if you were a worker in this company?” 
Participants recorded responses to each of the four questions on a 7 point Likert-type 
scale, 1 indicated the lowest level of the dependant variable and 7 indicated the highest level of 
the dependant variable. Each Likert-type scale utilised anchors that illustrated the negative low 
end of the scale, the neutral mid-point, and the positive high end of the scale, as in the example 
below. 
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1. Employment Scenario. 
You are a worker in a company. You receive a wage which is fair for the type of work you do, 
this is paid to you weekly. 
 The company has shareholders who are the owners of the company, they receive a portion of 
any profits the company makes and can sell their shares for money. The value of their shares may 
increase if the company performs well, or decrease if the company performs badly. 
You do not own shares in the company. 
  Decisions regarding the operation of the company are made by management. Major decisions 
must gain the approval of the shareholders who have a right to vote on these decisions. Workers like 
you are not consulted or included in the process of making major company decisions. 
 Information regarding the performance of the company is provided to the shareholders by 
management, but not to workers such as yourself. 
 
Questions: 
1) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how just, or fair, do you believe that 
this type of employment arrangement is to workers in the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very unfair.          Neither fair                                 Very fair. 
            nor unfair. 
 
2) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how committed do you believe you 
would feel towards the company, its goals, and its ongoing success if you were a worker here? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not committed at all            Neutral             Completely committed 
to the company,              to the company 
its goals, or success.                its goals and success. 
 
3) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how would you rate your belief that 
you personally owned some of this company, i.e. would you see yourself as an owner of the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely not              Neutral         Most definitely 
an owner.                          an owner. 
 
4) How satisfactory would you find the employment situation described in the scenario above if 
you were a worker in this company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
I would be extremely             Neutral           I would be extremely 
dissatisfied with this                   satisfied with this 
employment situation.               employment situation. 
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3.14 Procedure 
 Each participant was given one questionnaire to complete and one envelope for return of 
the completed questionnaire to maintain anonymity. One chocolate bar per participant was given 
as an inducement for participation. Participants completed the questionnaires unsupervised. 
Participants returned the completed questionnaires in the provided envelopes. 
Participants first read a standard coversheet and instructions for the questionnaire 
(Appendix B). Participants then read each of the four scenarios and indicated a response to each 
of four questions that followed each scenario by circling a number from 1 to 7 on the Likert-type 
scale (Appendix B). The order and serial position of the scenarios within each questionnaire was 
randomised.  Participants then read a standard debrief sheet before handing in their completed 
questionnaire (Appendix B).  
3.2 Results 
 Mean scores for the four survey questions (Justice, Commitment, Ownership, and 
Satisfaction) and their respective standard deviations were calculated for each of the four 
scenarios (Employment, Share Trust, Representative Control, and Direct Control). These are 
provided in graph form in Figure 1. A table of these results is in Appendix A. 
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Figure 1. Means scores for survey questions across survey scenarios. 
 
 A one-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to establish if 
there was a significant difference in the mean scores for each survey question across the four 
scenarios. For all the questions the mean scores increased across consecutive conditions with the 
Employment condition receiving the lowest scores, the Share Trust condition was scored the 
next highest, next Representative Control and finally the Direct Control condition received the 
highest scores in all questions. 
 For the Justice question there was an overall significant difference in the means across 
the four scenarios, F(3, 111) = 22.79, p < 0.001. The effect size was η2
 
 = 0.38. A Bonferroni 
procedure indicated that the Justice scores for the Employment and Share Trust conditions were 
not significantly different from one another. Justice scores were significantly different between 
the other condition combinations (p < 0.05).  
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 For the Commitment question there was also an overall significant difference in the 
means across the four scenarios, F(3, 111) = 28.49, p < 0.001. The effect size was η2
There was an overall significant difference in the means across the four scenarios for the 
Ownership question, F(3, 111) = 61.30, p < 0.001. The effect size was η
 = 0.44. A 
Bonferroni procedure indicated that Commitment scores were not significantly different between 
the Representative Control and the Direct Control conditions. Commitment was significantly 
different between all other condition combinations (p < 0.05).  
2
There was an overall significant difference in the means for the Satisfaction question 
across the four scenarios, F(3, 111) = 25.45, p < 0.001. The effect size was η
 = 0.62. A Bonferroni 
procedure indicated that all the scores for Ownership were significantly different from one 
another across all four scenarios (p < 0.01).  
2
Two 4×2 ANOVAS were performed to establish whether there were any significant 
interactions between the dependant variables and the two groups: Male and Female; and Worker 
and Non-Worker. One significant interaction was found, this was for the Satisfaction question 
between Scenario and Male and Female, F(3, 108) = 3.01, p < 0.05. The effect size here was 
small, η
 = 0.41. A 
Bonferroni procedure indicated that Satisfaction in the Direct Control condition was scored 
significantly higher than all the other conditions (p < 0.01). Satisfaction in the Representative 
Control condition was significantly higher than the Employment condition (p < 0.001), and the 
other combinations of conditions were not significantly different.  
2
 
 = 0.08. This interaction indicated that Females found the Employment scenario less 
satisfactory than Males, and that Females found the Direct control scenario more satisfactory 
than Males (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Graph of interaction between scenario and male and female on the satisfaction question. 
 
This interaction may indicate that women find equity, control, and information more 
important in determining workplace satisfaction than do men. Hence rating the low-level 
scenario “Employment” as being less satisfactory than did the men, and rating the high-level 
“Direct control” scenario as being more satisfactory than the men. 
 Overall the results indicated that respondents preferred the conditions that depicted 
greater levels of the three rights of ownership: equity, control, and information; to those that 
depicted lesser levels of these dimensions. The Ownership measure provided the greatest range 
of scores (M = 2.18 to M = 5.92). The low Ownership scores in the Employment condition (M = 
2.18) may have resulted from instructing respondents that workers are not owners. In the Share 
Trust scenario respondents were also told that they did not personally own shares, however an 
allocation of shares was held on their behalf. The Ownership score here was M = 3.68, close to a 
neutral score of 4 on the scale. 
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4. Experiment 2 
 
 Experiment 1 indicated clearly that participants were able to differentiate between 
scenarios and preferred those with greater levels of equity, control, and information. 
The control dimension of ownership has been found to carry significant influence over 
outcomes such as individual attitudes and organisational performance. Pierce et al. (2004) 
illustrated a positive relationship between control over the job context and feelings of 
psychological ownership, and Faleye et al. (2005) described how employee control can lead to 
sub-optimal organisational decision making. 
 To establish whether employee control can be limited while still obtaining the positive 
outcomes associated with employee ownership, Experiment 2 investigated whether participants 
show a preference for either of two types of control: Operational Control or Governance control, 
while holding equity and information constant. Operational Control represented control over the 
job context, or “participative decision making” identified by Pierce et al. (2004) as a dimension 
of work environment structure that contributes to feelings of psychological ownership. 
Governance Control represented the voting rights associated with company shares and their 
potential to influence higher order strategic organisational decision making. 
4.1 Method 
4.11 Participants 
There were 55 participants in total, 31 male and 24 female participants. Ages ranged 
from 18 years to 65 years with a mean age of 31.5 (SD = 14.37) years. Participants were 
volunteers, recruited from the researcher’s social contacts and from the general student 
population at the University of Canterbury. Each participant was tested independently.  
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 There were two groups in the study; Workers and Students. There were 17 males and 12 
females in the worker group. Ages ranged from 18 to 65 years with a mean age of 41.9 (SD = 
12.5) years. There were 14 males and 12 females in the student group ages ranged from 18 years 
to 27 years with an average age of 19.9 (SD = 2.0) years.  
4.12 Design 
 The study was a 2 (Governance Control: non- versus present) × 2 (Operational Control: 
non- versus present) within subjects design. Participants were exposed to all four combinations 
of the independent variables presented in the form of four written scenarios: (1) No Worker 
Control, (2) Operational Control Only, (3) Governance Control Only, and (4) Operational and 
Governance Control. The presentation order of the scenarios was randomised.  There were 4 
dependant measures, each representing a different construct: (1) organisational justice, (2) 
organisational commitment, (3) psychological ownership, and (4) satisfaction. These were the 
same dependent measures as used in Experiment 1.  
4.13 Materials 
Printed questionnaires were used (Appendix C). Each questionnaire consisted of 4 
scenarios followed by four questions. Each scenario represented a particular type of employment 
situation. All four scenarios were preceded by the same introduction which described three roles 
in a hypothetical organisation, worker, manager, and shareholder; and described the decision-
making responsibilities of each role. The introduction also explained that workers owned shares 
in the organisation from which they may benefit financially (Table 1).  
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Table 1 
Introduction page to survey used for Experiment 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The scenarios were: (1) No Worker Control. As the control the No Worker Control 
scenario depicted an employment situation where workers owned shares in a company but did 
not have either operational control or governance control over the company. 
 
Introduction 
The introduction below applies to all the scenarios that appear on the following pages. 
You are a worker in a company. You receive a wage which is fair for the type of work you do, 
this is paid to you weekly. As a worker you are responsible for the tasks that are a part of your job 
and you make basic decisions regarding the performance of these tasks e.g. deciding how hard you 
will work, how best to carry out the tasks necessary to perform your job, and how dependable you will 
be as a worker – the same as any worker in any traditional type of job.  
The company also employs managers, the managers have more responsibility than workers 
and are better paid. The managers make decisions regarding the overall operation of the company, 
decisions such as: the scheduling of work, planning the inputs necessary to complete projects, and 
allocating work to the workers who are best suited to perform it. Managers are also responsible for 
the strategies that the company will pursue to be successful in the long term. 
 The company has shareholders who are the owners of the company. They own shares in the 
company and receive a portion of any profits the company makes (known as a dividend). The amount 
of dividend a shareholder is paid is based on the number of shares they own. Shareholders can also 
sell their shares for money. The value of the shares may increase if the company performs well, or 
decrease if the company performs badly. 
Major company decisions must gain the approval of the company’s shareholders. As owners 
of the company they have a right to vote to approve or disapprove these decisions. This enables the 
shareholders to exert some control over the company and protect the money that they have invested in 
their company shares. 
 In this company workers also own an allocation of shares. This means that in addition to 
your regular wage you will receive a portion of any profit the company makes. If the company 
performs well your shares may increase in value, but may decrease in value if the company 
performs badly. You may sell your shares if you leave the company. All shareholders, including 
workers, are provided with information regarding the financial performance of the company 
regularly. 
Please continue and remember this introduction when reading the scenarios that follow. 
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(2) Operational Control Only. This scenario described a situation where workers owned 
shares in a company and were involved in operational decision making but had no governance 
control over the organisation. 
(3) Governance Control Only. Here workers were depicted as owning shares in the 
company and as having the governance control accorded to typical shareholders, but where the 
shareholding workers had no involvement in operational decision making. 
(4) Operational and Governance Control. In the final scenario workers were depicted as 
owning shares with the governance control rights accorded to shareholders’, and also being 
involved in operational decision making (Table 2). 
The same four questions were asked after each scenario; (1) Justice, (2) Commitment, (3) 
Ownership, and (4) Satisfaction. Each question asked participants to consider the information 
provided in the scenario and to score the level of the particular dependent variable that they 
perceived. These were identical to those used in Experiment 1 and responded to with the same 7 
point Likert-type scales as before. 
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Table 2 
Scenario 4 as used in Experiment 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.14 Procedure 
 Each participant was provided with one questionnaire to complete and one envelope for 
return of the completed questionnaire to maintain anonymity. One chocolate bar per participant 
was given as an inducement for participation. Participants completed the questionnaires 
unsupervised.  
Participants first read a standard coversheet and instructions for the questionnaire 
(Appendix C). Participants then read the introduction page and then each of the four scenarios, 
they indicated a response to each of four questions that followed each scenario by circling a 
number from 1 to 7 on the Likert-type scale (Appendix C). The order and serial position of the 
Scenario 4: Operational and Governance Control. 
As explained previously, you are a worker in a company where you are responsible for the 
tasks that are a part of your job and you make basic decisions regarding the performance of these 
tasks. In this company there are also managers. Managers have more responsibility than workers 
and make decisions regarding the overall operation of the company and are responsible for longer 
term strategies. 
In this company workers also actively participate with the managers in decision making 
about the overall operation of the company. This means that workers are not just responsible for the 
tasks that are a part of their jobs, they are also involved in work related decisions that would 
traditionally be the sole responsibility of a manager. Through this involvement in managerial 
decision making workers are able to share their work-related knowledge, help to improve the 
performance of the company, and provide a better workplace benefiting everyone in the company. 
This is known as participative management and is intended to encourage an open and cooperative 
relationship between management and workers by including workers in some company decision 
making. 
In this company major decisions must gain the approval of the company’s shareholders as 
they have a right to vote to approve or disapprove these decisions. The shares owned by workers in 
the company are the same as the shares owned by the other shareholders so the workers are also 
involved in this process of approving major decisions. Workers therefore also have some control 
over the company the same as the other shareholders. This is in addition to making decisions about 
tasks in their jobs, and participating with managers in operational decision making. The purpose 
of the workers’ shares is to provide the financial benefits of share ownership to workers, and as a 
consequence of this arrangement the workers’ shares also provide them with some control over the 
company. 
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scenarios within each questionnaire was randomised.  Participants then read a standard debrief 
sheet before handing in their completed questionnaire (Appendix C).  
4.2 Results and Discussion 
 Mean scores for the four survey questions (Justice, Commitment, Ownership, and 
Satisfaction) and their respective standard deviations were calculated for each of the four 
scenarios (No Worker Control, Operational Control Only, Governance Control Only, and 
Operational and Governance Control). These are provided in graph form in Figure 3. A table of 
these results is in Appendix A. 
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Figure 3. Mean scores for dependent measures (justice, commitment, ownership, and satisfaction). 
 
Higher scores were recorded in all four dependent measures as the depicted level of 
control increased: lowest scores were recorded for no worker control, next was operational 
control only, then governance control only, and operational control and governance control 
received the highest scores. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Mean scores for justice question.  Figure 3.2. Mean scores for commitment question. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Mean scores for ownership question.  Figure 3.4. Mean scores for satisfaction question 
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A 2×2 repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine whether 
there were any significant main effects between the levels of the independent variables for each 
dependant measure, and whether there was any interaction present.  
When Operational Control was present Justice was scored more highly, F(1, 54) = 24.24, 
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.31, and when Governance Control was present Justice was scored more highly, 
F(1, 54) = 42.81, p < 0.001, η2
When Operational Control was present Commitment was scored more highly, F(1, 54) = 
21.58, p < 0.001, η
 = 0.44. There was no interaction between Operational Control 
and Governance Control for the justice question (Figure 3.1). 
2 = 0.29, and when Governance Control was present Commitment was scored 
more highly, F(1, 54) = 66.84, p < 0.001, η2
When Operational Control was present Ownership was scored more highly, F(1, 54) = 
15.37, p < 0.001, η
 = 0.55. There was no interaction between 
Operational Control and Governance Control for the Commitment question (Figure 3.2). 
2 = 0.22, and when Governance Control was present Ownership was scored 
more highly, F(1, 54) = 100.31, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.65. There was a significant interaction between 
Operational Control and Governance Control for the Ownership question, ownership scores 
increased at a greater rate when Operational Control was present without Governance control 
than when Operational Control and Governance Control were present together, F(1, 54) = 4.88, 
p < 0.05, η2
When Operational Control was present Satisfaction was scored more highly, F(1, 54) = 
29.64, p < 0.001, η
 = 0.08 (Figure 3.3). 
2 = 0.35, and when Governance Control was present Satisfaction was scored 
more highly, F(1, 54) = 48.88, p < 0.001, η2
A 2×2×2 repeated measures ANOVA using the factors Governance Control, Operational 
Control, and the categorical predictor Worker and Non-Worker was performed to determine 
 = 0.48. There was no interaction between 
Operational Control and Governance Control for the satisfaction question (Figure 3.4). 
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whether there was any significant interactions between the dependant measures and the 
categorical predictor. 
For the dependant measure Ownership there was a significant 2-way interaction between 
Governance Control and Group, F(1, 53) = 4.81, p < 0.05, η2
 
 = 0.08. The direction of the 
interaction indicated that feelings of ownership for Non-Workers were lower than for Workers 
when there was no Governance control, and that feelings of ownership for Non-Workers 
increased to a higher level than Workers when Governance control was present (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Interaction between governance control (non- vs. present) and group (worker vs. non-worker) for 
the question on feelings of ownership. 
 
 This result indicates that the non-workers associated stronger feelings of ownership with 
the condition of governance control than did workers. The more pronounced effect obtained 
from non-workers may indicate a preference based on expectation rather than experience in the 
workforce.  
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For the dependant measure Satisfaction there was a significant 3-way interaction between 
Governance Control, Operational Control, and Group,  F(1, 53) = 9.81, p < 0.005, η2
 
 = 0.16 
(Figure 5).  
Figure5. Three-way interaction between governance control (non- vs. present), operational control (non- vs. 
present), and group (worker vs. non-worker) for the dependent measure satisfaction. 
 
While both non-workers and workers preferred higher levels of governance and 
operational control, the non-workers found the situation of having neither operational control or 
governance control significantly less satisfactory than did the workers. When operational control 
was present the non-workers’ satisfaction increased to a score higher than the workers’ and the 
rate of this increase was higher than that of the increase in satisfaction for governance control 
(Figure 5). 
This result may indicate that compared to workers, non-workers have an inflated 
expectation of the importance of operational control to job satisfaction. The less pronounced 
effect obtained from workers may indicate an expectation taken from experience of how relevant 
this dimension is to job satisfaction. 
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A 2×2×2 repeated measures ANOVA using the factors Governance Control, Operational 
Control, and the categorical predictor Sex determined that there were no significant interactions 
between these factors for each dependant measure. 
Overall the results indicate that respondents preferred the conditions that depicted 
employment situations with more control. Respondents preferred least of all the no worker 
control condition which depicted no operational and no governance control. This condition 
received the lowest scores on all four dependant variables.   
Respondents preferred governance control over operational control. The condition 
governance control only scored higher on all dependent measures than the condition operational 
control only. The effect size for governance control was stronger with larger partial eta squared 
scores evident than those for operational control.  
Respondents preferred having both forms of control present together. Governance control 
and operational control had an additive effect with the condition operational control and 
governance control receiving the highest scores for all four dependent measures. 
 The justice, commitment, and satisfaction questions produced similar results with 
similar means recorded across the four conditions. This may indicate these dependent measures 
were all measuring a similar construct. 
 The ownership question provided comparatively lower scores across the four conditions. 
This result may indicate that control does not have as greater effect on feelings of ownership as 
it has on the dependent variables of justice, commitment, and satisfaction. 
Governance control scored higher than operational control across all scenarios for the 
ownership question. The effect here was strong, η2 = 0.65. This result indicates that operational 
control by itself does not engender strong feelings of ownership; however the presence of 
governance control does so.  
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 While respondents were informed in the survey that they owned company shares, it is 
possible that factors not specified, such as the quantity of equity held, may have more effect on 
feelings of ownership than control over the company or company operations. 
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5. Experiment 3 
 
 Faleye et al. (2005) hypothesised that employee owners use their governance rights to 
maximised the combined returns of their fixed and variable claims on the firm. Typically the 
fixed returns employees receive in the form of wages and salaries are far greater than the 
variable returns they receive as equity holders. 
 Experiment 3 investigated if participant’s preferences for operational and governance 
control change as the fixed portion of their income decreases and the variable portion increases. 
Experiment 3 also assessed whether participant’s feelings of ownership and justice changed 
under the same conditions. 
5.1 Method 
5.11 Participants 
 There were 20 male and 20 female participants. The range of ages was from 19 years to 
66 years, mean age was 36.78 (SD = 12.25) years. Participants were volunteers recruited from 
the researcher’s social contacts and each was tested individually. Five questionnaires were 
excluded from the study. Three were returned incomplete, and two were returned with 
ambiguous responses. 
5.12 Design 
 Experiment 3 was a 1-by-4 within-subjects design. Participants were exposed to four 
levels of the independent variable – scenarios 1 through 4. The scenarios were (1) Employment, 
(2) Low Risk, (3) Medium Risk, and (4) High Risk. The order of presentation of the scenarios 
was randomised. There were 4 dependent measures: (1) Importance of Governance Control, (2) 
Importance of Operational Control, (3) Organisational Justice, and (4) Psychological Ownership. 
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5.13 Materials 
 Printed questionnaires were used (Appendix D). Each questionnaire consisted of a cover 
sheet including instructions on how to complete the questionnaire, 4 scenarios followed by four 
questions, and a page requesting basic demographic information. Each scenario described an 
employment or employee-ownership situation that represented a different amount of risk to the 
employee by specifying a different ratio of fixed salary to at-risk salary. Higher levels of at-risk 
salary represented more risk to the employee. 
 Scenario 1: Employment Scenario. The control scenario depicted a typical employment 
relationship where employees received a fixed weekly salary with no at-risk component. 
Employees did not own any shares in the employing company. 
 Scenarios 2, 3, and 4 represented employee ownership situations where employees also 
owned company shares. Scenario 2: Low Risk. Employee-owners experienced a low level of risk 
on the income they received with 75% being fixed and 25% variable based on any dividend paid 
on their shareholding. Scenario 3: Medium Risk. Employee-owners experienced a medium level 
of risk on the income they received with 50% being fixed and 50% being based on any dividend 
paid on their shareholding. Scenario 4: High Risk. Employee-owners experienced a high level of 
risk on the income they received with 25% being fixed and 75% being based on any dividend 
paid on their shareholding. 
 The same four questions were asked after each scenario. Each question required the 
participant to consider the information provided in the scenario and score the level of the 
dependent variable that they perceived. 
 The questions were: (1) Importance of Governance Control, (2) Importance of 
Operational Control, (3) Organisational Justice, (4) Psychological Ownership,  
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Participants recorded responses to each of the four questions on a 7 point Likert-type 
scale, 1 indicated the lowest level of the dependant variable and 7 indicated the highest level of 
the dependant variable. Each Likert-type scale utilised anchors that illustrated the negative low 
end of the scale, the neutral mid-point, and the positive high end of the scale, see Table 3. 
5.14 Procedure 
 Each participant was given one questionnaire to complete and one envelope to maintain 
anonymity of returned questionnaires. One chocolate bar per participant was given as an 
inducement for participation. Participants completed the questionnaires unsupervised.  
Participants first read a standard coversheet and instructions for the questionnaire 
(Appendix D). Participants then read each of the four scenarios and indicated a response to each 
of four questions that followed each scenario by circling a number from 1 to 7 on the Likert-type 
scale (Appendix D). The order and serial position of the scenarios within each questionnaire was 
randomised.  Participants then read a standard debrief sheet before handing in their completed 
questionnaire (Appendix D).  
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Table 3 
Scenario 4 as used in Experiment 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 
You work for a company where you are paid in part by a fixed weekly salary. The company is 
arranged so that workers also own some company shares. If the company is profitable then in addition to 
the weekly salary you are also paid a dividend, this is your share of the profit. The amount of dividend paid 
is variable. If the company makes a large profit then the dividend paid is large, if the profit is small then a 
small dividend is paid, and if the company makes no profit then no dividend is paid. 
 As a worker your total income is the amount of your fixed salary plus any dividend you are due. 
When the company is performing at an average level, you would expect 25% of your income to be earned 
from your fixed salary and 75% of your income to be from the dividend. This provides you with a fair 
income for the work you do. However, the amount of dividend you receive may be more or less than 75% 
depending on the performance of the company. 
Questions 
1) In this situation how important would it be to you to be able to vote for or against major company 
decisions suggested by management? Voting would enable you to have some governance control over the 
company.  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not important                  Neutral                 Very 
at all.                important.
  
 
2) In this situation how important would it be to you to be able to participate with management in 
decision making surrounding the daily operation of the company? Participating in work related decisions 
would give you some operational control over the company.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not important                  Neutral                Very 
at all.              important. 
 
 
3) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how just, or fair, do you believe that this 
type of employment arrangement is to workers in the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very unfair.              Neither fair         Very fair. 
                nor unfair. 
 
 
4) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how would you rate your belief that you 
personally owned some of this company, i.e. would you see yourself as an owner of the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely not                 Neutral                 Most definitely 
an owner.                                   an owner. 
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5.2 Results  
 Mean scores for the four survey questions (Importance of Governance Control, 
Importance of Operational Control, Organisational Justice, and Psychological Ownership) and 
standard deviations for each were calculated for all of the four scenarios (Employment, Low 
Risk, Medium Risk, and High Risk). These are provided in Figure 6. A table of these results is in 
Appendix A. 
 
 
Figure 6. Means scores for survey questions across survey scenarios. 
 
 A 1-by-4 Repeated Measures ANOVA was used to determine whether there was a 
significant main effect for each of the dependent measures across the four scenarios. For the 
dependent measures: Importance of Governance Control, Importance of Operational Control, 
and Ownership, the mean score increased over consecutive scenarios. The Employment scenario 
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received the lowest scores and the High Risk scenario received the highest scores. For the 
measure Justice, the mean scores decreased over consecutive scenarios with the Employment 
scenario receiving the highest score and the High Risk scenario receiving the lowest score.  
 For Importance of Governance Control there was a significant main effect across 
scenarios, F(3, 117) = 95.40, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.71. A Bonferroni procedure indicated that scores 
between the medium and high risk scenarios were not significantly different, but all other 
scenario combinations were significantly different (p < 0.005).For Importance of Operational 
Control there was a significant main effect across the four scenarios, F(3, 117) = 53.54, p < 
0.001, η2 = 0.58. A Bonferroni procedure indicated that scores the medium and high risk 
scenarios were not significantly different, but all other combinations were significantly different 
(p < 0.05).There was a significant main effect for Justice F(3, 117) = 3.11, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.07. A 
Bonferroni procedure indicated that only scores between the employment and high risk scenarios 
were significantly different (p < 0.05). All other combinations were not significantly different. 
Ownership also returned a significant main effect F (3, 117) = 99.50, p < 0.001, η2
Overall the results indicated that as the level of at risk salary increased as a percentage of 
total salary the preference for control and feelings of ownership also increased. 
 = 0.72. The 
Bonferroni procedure indicated that scores for ownership in all combinations of scenarios 1 
through 4 were significantly different with the exception of scenarios 3 and 4 which were not (p 
< 0.05). A 2 ×4 repeated measures ANOVA was performed to assess if there was any interaction 
between the mean scores and sex for each scenario. There were no main effects for sex and no 
interactions present. 
 For the dependent measures Importance of Governance Control and Importance of 
Operational Control respondents preferred greater levels of both as the level of at-risk salary 
increased as a percentage of total salary. Scores for both measures were very similar suggesting 
than both forms of control were valued similarly. The Employment scenario provided the lowest 
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preference for control and the High Risk scenario provided the highest preference for control in 
both measures. This result indicates that as risk over incoem increases employees prefer greater 
control over the organisation and the operation of work. 
 For the dependent measure Ownership respondents indicated that the level of perceived 
ownership increased as the level of at-risk salary increased as a percentage of total salary. This 
result indicates that as employees experience greater levels of risk over income they express 
greater feelings of ownership. The lowest mean score for the Ownership measure was M = 1.55 
which was obtained for the Employment scenario. This low score may be a result of instructing 
respondents that the company has shareholders but that they do not own company shares.  
 The scores for the dependent measure Justice displayed a different trend to the other 
three dependent measures. Respondents indicated that employment situations with lower levels 
of risk were perceived as being fairer than employment situations with higher levels of risk. 
There was only a small difference in perceived fairness between the low risk and medium risk 
conditions. 
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6. Discussion 
 
Employee ownership has been proposed as a way to integrate employer and employee 
interests and it has been positively related to organisational attitudes such as organisational 
commitment, satisfaction, organisational justice, and psychological ownership in employees (Chi 
& Han, 2008; Mayhew et al., 2007; Pierce et al., 1991; Pierce et al., 2001; Pierce et al., 2003; 
Pierce & Rodgers, 2004; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004; Wagner et al., 2003). Economists have 
suggested, however, that employee ownership results in suboptimal organisational decision 
making which has a detrimental effect on organisational financial performance (Dow, 2003; 
Faleye et al., 2005; Hansmann, 1996). My studies investigated whether the psychological effects 
related to employee ownership are affected by the level of employee control over the 
organisation. 
 Experiment 1 investigated whether individuals were able to differentiate between 
different levels of equity, control, and information depicted as an employment scenario (control), 
and three different employee ownership scenarios. Overall it was found that participants 
preferred greater levels of the three ownership factors. The direct control scenario that depicted 
the highest levels of equity, control, and information was rated the highest on; organisational 
commitment, organisational justice, satisfaction, and psychological ownership. The employment 
scenario, as the control, depicted none of the three factors and was rated the lowest. This result 
supports findings that employee ownership produces positive organisational attitudes (Chi & 
Han, 2008; Mayhew et al., 2007; Pierce et al., 1991; Pierce et al., 2001; Pierce et al., 2003; 
Pierce & Rodgers, 2004; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004; Wagner et al., 2003), and also supports the 
claim made by Pierce and Rodgers (2004) that employee ownership schemes which provide the 
rights of equity, control, and information will result in feelings of psychological ownership. 
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The results also showed that the equity, control, and information are more important to 
females that males in determining satisfaction in the workplace. Female participants rated the 
employment scenario lower than males on the satisfaction question and rated the direct control 
employee ownership scenario higher than males on the satisfaction question. 
Of the three requisites for psychological and formal ownership, the control factor is of 
special interest. Employee control is exercised through the processes of organisational decision 
making (O’Driscoll et al., 2006, Pierce et al., 2004) which have the potential to significantly 
influence organisational performance (Dow, 2003; Faleye et al., 2005; Hansmann, 1996). As 
was pointed out in the introduction Hansmann (1996) and Dow (2003) have proposed that poor 
financial performance of employee owned firms (See: Faleye et al., 2005) can be attributed to 
problems arising from collective decision making. Decision making in employee owned firms 
may be more complex and costly than that in investor owned firms because employees have 
more heterogeneous preferences than investors (Dow & Putterman, 1999; Hansmann, 
1996).Thus, some economists recommend limiting employee control over organisational 
decision making to improve the financial performance of employee owned firms. This 
recommendation is contrasted with that of psychology researchers who have found that 
employee control is beneficial to individuals and the organisation (Avey et al., 2009; Chi and 
Han, 2008; Pierce et al., 2004, Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004; Vandewalle et al., 1995). 
Experiment 2 investigated the preferences individuals had for either operational or 
governance control, represented as four conditions: no worker control, operational control only, 
governance control only, and operational and governance control combined. The conditions 
described employee ownership situations where the equity and information dimensions of 
ownership were held constant. Operational Control represented control over the job context 
through participative decision making, and Governance Control represented higher order 
strategic control through the voting rights associated with company shares. This experiment 
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assessed if the recommendation made by economists to limit employee control over the 
organisation (see: Dow, 2003; Faleye et al., 2005; Hansmann, 1996) would be feasible by 
investigating if the positive outcomes associated with employee ownership can be obtained 
without governance control.  
The results of Experiment 2 showed that the positive attitudinal outcomes related to 
employee ownership increase as the level of employee control increases. Overall governance 
control was associated with higher levels of commitment, satisfaction, justice, and ownership 
than was operational control. The condition that depicted both operational and governance 
control combined was rated highest, next was governance control only, then operational control 
only, and finally, no employee control was rated lowest.  
The results showed that governance control is necessary for feelings of ownership to 
develop. Ownership was rated significantly higher in conditions that depicted governance 
control. The effect was strong. Ownership ratings for the operational control only condition were 
not above neutral on the scale, as were the ratings for the no control condition which was rated 
the lowest. Operational control produced an additive effect when combined with governance 
control; ownership ratings were highest when governance control and operational control were 
present together. Ratings for psychological ownership were lower than those for the other 
dependent variables, and were only rated above neutral on the scale when governance control 
was present. The same trend was evident with ownership as was with the other dependent 
variables.  
Ratings for ownership increased markedly between the no control and operational control 
only conditions. Here operational control by itself produced a greater increase in feelings of 
ownership than it did in combination with governance control. This indicates that the stronger 
preference for governance control, in terms of ownership feelings, outweighs the effect due to 
operational control.  
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By separating operational from governance control it was possible to see that 
progressively greater levels of control are associated with progressively stronger feelings of 
psychological ownership and the other related attitudes. These results support the findings of 
Pierce et al. (2004) and Wagner (2003) that greater employee control in the workplace is 
positively related to feelings of ownership, and is in accordance with the theory proposed by 
Pierce et al. (2004) that having control over higher order organisational processes, such as 
strategic decision making, will have a greater impact on feelings of psychological ownership. 
These results help to evaluate the recommendation to limit employee control over the 
organisation. If the desired result is strong feelings of psychological ownership and high levels 
of related attitudes then governance control is clearly necessary. However, if lower but still 
positive levels of these attitudes are an acceptable outcome then limiting some features of 
employee control over the organisation would be an acceptable solution. This would be so if the 
trade off reached between higher levels of positive attitudes and the cost incurred from limited 
employee control is found to be positive.   
 Non-workers associated stronger feelings of psychological ownership with the conditions 
that depicted governance control than did workers. Similarly, non-workers found the condition 
that depicted neither operational or governance control less satisfactory than did workers. The 
more pronounced preference for control indicated by non-workers may be based on expectations 
about the nature of the workplace rather than real world experience as with workers.  
The claim by Faleye et al. (2005) that employee owners use control rights to maximise 
their fixed and variable returns from the organisation is an example of different employee and 
investor preferences for the operation of an organisation. Heterogeneous preferences are 
believed to result in sub-optimal organisational outcomes and explain the poorer financial 
performance of employee owned firms (Dow, 2003; Faleye et al., 2005; Hansmann, 1996).The 
fixed returns that employees receive in the form of wages and salaries are typically far greater 
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than the variable returns they receive as equity holders. Investors however only receive a 
variable income in the form of dividends from their equity holdings. Experiment 3 investigated 
if employee preferences for operational and governance control differ as the fixed portion of 
their income decreased and the variable portion increased; and whether perceptions of ownership 
and justice also changed under the same circumstances. 
Experiment 3 showed that participants consider both operational and governance control 
to be more important as the level of variable income increased. Scores for both importance of 
operational and governance control were very similar suggesting that both are valued similarly 
and that there is little differentiation between the two. In the high risk condition importance of 
both operational and governance control were rated near the maximum on the scale. As risk over 
income increases employees want greater control over their jobs and the organisation.  
The difference in importance of control between the medium risk and high risk 
conditions was not statistically significant and for these risk levels importance of control was 
close to maximum on the scale. This suggests that employees consider that they should have 
high levels of control over their jobs and the organisation when the variable component of their 
income is 50 percent of their total income or above. 
Employee feelings of ownership increase as the level of at-risk income increased. Thus, 
employees consider themselves to be more like owners as the risk experienced over their income 
increases. 
An interesting result was found for justice in this experiment. As the level of variable 
income increased, perceived justice decreased, which was a different trend to the other 
dependent measures. Conditions with higher levels of risk over income were perceived to be less 
fair. Distributional justice is the perceived fairness of allocation decisions (Aryee et al., 2002) 
and it is likely that higher levels of risk over income are perceived as being less fair by 
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employees. The range of justice scores was not large; all fell between 4 (neutral) on the scale and 
5, and justice scores between the low risk and medium risk conditions were not significantly 
different from one another. This indicates that employees do not find variable income to be 
unfair overall, but find fixed income to be fairer. Employees do not differentiate between 
situations where variable income is between 25% and 50% of total income, but find high levels 
(75%) of variable income to be less fair. 
 The results from these three experiments show that employees value control very highly 
in employee ownership situations. Governance control with its associated higher order strategic 
influence is valued more highly than influence over the job context through operational control. 
Higher levels of commitment, satisfaction, justice, and ownership are associated with 
governance control than with operational control. This being the case, it appears that to realise 
the full benefits of employee ownership, full control must be offered to employees by providing 
governance and operational control. However, it is evident that some of the benefits related to 
employee ownership would be realised in situations where employee control is limited to either 
operational control only, or governance control only.  
 6.1 Implications 
Experiment 3 showed that as employees face a greater variable component in their total 
income they prefer greater control. As variable income increases it could be assumed that 
employee preferences would become more like those of investors. If so, then an effective 
method to reduce the problem of heterogeneous preferences in decision making would be to 
match the limit of employee control over the organisation with the level of the variable 
component of an employee’s income. As an example, the variable component of income could 
be the dividend payable on an equity stake in the organisation. Those with a small equity stake, 
and a small variable income would receive little control; those with a large equity stake, 
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associated high variable income, and assumedly investor like preferences, would receive greater 
control. 
Additionally, in the situations where employee income has a large variable component 
the consequences of employee control would be felt acutely through rises and falls in that 
income. This would provide a feedback mechanism, which would assumedly align employee 
preferences with those of investors. Therefore, as an additional solution to the problem of 
heterogeneous preferences, implementing HRM systems that provide immediate feedback to 
employees about the consequences of their decisions may be an effective means to align 
employee preferences with those of investors’. This would require employees to face 
consequences over their choices. In the case where employee equity stakes are relatively small, 
additional performance requirements, perhaps in the form of a balanced score-card, could be 
used to provide additional weight to those consequences as a way to encourage responsible 
decision making. 
Evidenced by the results of these experiments, employees view ownership as entailing a 
right to governance control over the organisation. This may be due to cultural norms surrounding 
expectations of the rights associated with property ownership (Pierce et al., 1991).   
6.2 Limitations and Suggestions for the Future 
A key limitation of this research is that data was obtained from the general population, so 
stated preferences will be speculative. Different results may have been obtained from a sample 
of individuals experienced in different forms of employee ownership. 
The measures used in this research were opinion based not validated measures for 
organisational commitment, justice, satisfaction, and psychological ownership. The ratings of the 
dependent measures may have been different if validated measures had been used.  
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 The operational definitions used for operational control and governance control in 
experiments 2 and 3 may not have accurately depicted the levels of influence obtainable with 
each. Specifically, governance control may have over represented the level of control an 
individual can obtain through the exercise of voting rights associated with a small holding of 
shares. Likewise, with operational control the level of influence over the job context is limited 
by operational practicalities −you can’t always get what you want. 
 As noted above, in Experiment 3 ratings of justice decreased as risk over income 
increased. In Experiment 2 ratings for perceived justice increased with increases in the level of 
employee control. A future study should investigate whether the decrease in justice perceptions 
occurs when an increase in risk over income is matched with an increase in employee control. 
This would determine if employee control is effective in maintaining perceptions of justice as 
risk over income increases. Operational control and governance control should be tested for 
separately to determine if different types of control have different effects on perceived justice 
under risk. Chi and Han (2008) found that organisational justice mediated the relationship 
between formal and psychological ownership. This proposal would investigate control as a 
possible moderator of justice. 
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Appendix A 
 
Mean scores with standard deviations across the scenarios of Experiment 1. 
 
Scenario  Employment Share Trust Representative Direct 
                      Control             
Question M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Control         . 
 
1. Justice 4.39 1.52 4.53 1.41 5.45 1.25 6.26  1.08 
2. Commitment 4.13 1.34 4.97 1.13 5.63 1.05 6.18 1.01 
3. Ownership 2.18 1.84 3.68 1.40 4.84 1.24 5.92 1.19 
4. Satisfaction 4.18 1.25 4.74 1.11 5.29 1.09 6.03 1.05 
 
 
 
Mean scores with standard deviations across the scenarios of Experiment 2. 
 
Scenario  No Worker Operational Governance Operational & 
  Control  Control Only Control Only Governance 
                                 Control 
Question M SD M SD M SD M SD 
 
1. Justice 4.45 1.42 5.11 1.23 5.29 1.28 6.20 1.01 
2. Commitment 4.40 1.26 5.07 1.00 5.67 1.12 6.27 0.76 
3. Ownership 2.69 1.50 3.47 1.41 4.80 1.69 5.07 1.63 
4. Satisfaction 4.33 1.25 5.25 0.93 5.45 1.05 6.05 0.87 
  
 
 
Mean scores with standard deviations across the scenarios of Experiment 3. 
            
Scenario   Employment Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk 
                                   
Question  M SD M SD M SD M SD 
 
1. Importance of  3.05 1.72 5.33 1.12 6.15 0.80 6.50 0.82 
 Governance Control 
2. Importance of  3.40 1.84 5.23 1.10 6.05 0.78 6.40 0.81 
 Operational Control 
3. Justice  5.00 1.62 4.68 1.27 4.63 1.39 4.15 1.69 
4. Ownership  1.55 1.18 4.58 1.62 5.30 1.54 5.55 1.40 
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Appendix B 
University of Canterbury Department of Psychology 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Employee Ownership and Preferences for Organisational Control. 
 
Please read the following note before completing this questionnaire.  
 
NOTE: You are invited to participate in the research project Employee Ownership 
and Preferences for Organisational Control by completing the following questionnaire. The 
aim of the project is to investigate individual preferences for organisational structure by 
employees in an employing organisation. 
The project is being carried out as a requirement for MSc Applied Psychology by Kim 
Fraser, who can be contacted at kfr24@student.canterbury.ac.nz, under the supervision of 
Prof. Simon Kemp, who can be contacted at simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz. They will be 
pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.  
 
The questionnaire is anonymous, and you will not be identified as a participant without 
your consent. 
 
You may withdraw your participation, including withdrawal of any information you 
have provided, until your questionnaire has been added to the others collected. Because 
it is anonymous, it cannot be retrieved after that.  
 
By completing the questionnaire it will be understood that you have consented to 
participate in the project, and that you consent to publication of the results of the 
project with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved. 
 
Instructions: 
On the following pages are several scenarios. Each scenario describes a different 
employment situation in a company. Each scenario is followed by four questions. Please read 
each scenario carefully, and then answer all four questions relating to the scenario you have 
just read before moving on to read the next scenario. Please indicate your response to each 
question by circling the number on the scale that best describes how you feel. Only one 
response per question is required. There are no right or wrong answers to the questions.  
 Scenario: 
 You are a worker in a company. You receive a wage which is fair for the type of work you do, this is 
paid to you weekly. 
 The company has shareholders who are the owners of the company, they receive a portion of any 
profits the company makes and can sell their shares for money. The value of their shares may increase if the 
company performs well, or decrease if the company performs badly. 
You do not own shares in the company. 
  Decisions regarding the operation of the company are made by management. Major decisions must 
gain the approval of the shareholders who have a right to vote on these decisions. Workers like you are not 
consulted or included in the process of making major company decisions. 
 Information regarding the performance of the company is provided to the shareholders by 
management, but not to workers such as yourself. 
 
Questions: 
1) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how just, or fair, do you believe that this 
type of employment arrangement is to workers in the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
     Very unfair.            Neither fair              Very fair. 
              nor unfair. 
 
2) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how committed do you believe you would 
feel towards the company, its goals, and its ongoing success if you were a worker here? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not committed at all              Neutral                        Completely 
to the company,                                    committed to the 
its goals, or success.                           company its goals 
       and success. 
 
3) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how would you rate your belief that you 
personally owned some of this company, i.e. would you see yourself as an owner of the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely not               Neutral     Most definitely 
an owner.                      an owner. 
 
4) How satisfactory would you find the employment situation described in the scenario above if you 
were a worker in this company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
I would be extremely              Neutral      I would be extremely 
dissatisfied with this             satisfied with this 
employment situation.            employment situation. 
 Scenario: 
 You are a worker in a company. You receive a wage which is fair for the type of work you do, this is 
paid to you weekly. 
 The company has shareholders who are the owners of the company, they receive a portion of any 
profits the company makes and can sell their shares for money. The value of their shares may increase if the 
company performs well, or decrease if the company performs badly. 
In addition to the shareholders, the company is arranged so that a trust holds an allocation of 
company shares on behalf of each worker. This means that a portion of the company’s shares are held for 
you by the trust, but you personally do not own the shares. (This is how trusts work). If the company makes 
a profit you will be paid a portion of this profit based on your allocation of shares held in the trust. This is 
paid in addition to your regular wage. The value of the shares may increase or decrease depending on the 
performance of the company. If you leave the company you will be paid money equal to the value of your 
share allocation held in the trust. 
Workers like you have no control over the company through the shares in the trust. Decisions 
regarding the operations of the company are made by management and major decisions must gain the 
approval of the other shareholders who have a right to vote on such decisions. 
 Information regarding the performance of the company is known by management and provided to 
the owning shareholders but is not provided to workers such as yourself. 
 
1) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how just, or fair, do you believe that this 
type of employment arrangement is to workers in the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
     Very unfair.            Neither fair              Very fair. 
              nor unfair. 
 
2) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how committed do you believe you would 
feel towards the company, its goals, and its ongoing success if you were a worker here? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not committed at all              Neutral                        Completely 
to the company,                                    committed to the 
its goals, or success.                           company its goals 
       and success. 
 
3) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how would you rate your belief that you 
personally owned some of this company, i.e. would you see yourself as an owner of the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely not               Neutral     Most definitely 
an owner.                      an owner. 
 
4) How satisfactory would you find the employment situation described in the scenario above if you 
were a worker in this company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
I would be extremely              Neutral      I would be extremely 
dissatisfied with this             satisfied with this 
employment situation.            employment situation. 
 
 
 Scenario: 
 You are a worker in a company. You receive a wage which is fair for the type of work you do, this is 
paid to you weekly. 
 The company has shareholders who are the owners of the company, they receive a portion of any 
profits the company makes and can sell their shares for money. The value of their shares may increase if the 
company performs well, or decrease if the company performs badly. 
 In this company every individual worker also owns some shares in the company. Through your 
shares you receive a portion of any profit the company makes, this is paid in addition to your regular wage. 
If the company does not make a profit you will still receive your regular wage, but no additional money. The 
value of your shares may increase if the company performs well, or decrease if the company performs badly. 
If a worker leaves the company they must sell their shares to other workers or shareholders. 
Decisions regarding the operation of the company are made by management. Major decisions must 
gain the approval of the shareholders who have a right to vote on the decisions. In this company workers use 
a different system to vote on company decisions than the other shareholders. Individual workers cannot vote 
on company decisions, instead workers choose a representative who represents all the workers as a 
collective group. The representative votes on your behalf when major company decisions are made. The 
representative is chosen for his or her ability to represent the worker’s views, and his or her professional 
business skill. The representative will consult with workers to find out what your interests are in regard to 
company decisions and will recommend what he or she believes will deliver the best outcome. Information 
regarding the performance of the company is provided to workers like you, the worker’s representative, and 
the other shareholders by the management of the company. 
 
1) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how just, or fair, do you believe that this 
type of employment arrangement is to workers in the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
     Very unfair.            Neither fair              Very fair. 
              nor unfair. 
 
2) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how committed do you believe you would 
feel towards the company, its goals, and its ongoing success if you were a worker here? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not committed at all              Neutral                        Completely 
to the company,                                    committed to the 
its goals, or success.                          company its goals and success 
 
3) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how would you rate your belief that you 
personally owned some of this company, i.e. would you see yourself as an owner of the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely not               Neutral     Most definitely 
an owner.                      an owner. 
 
4) How satisfactory would you find the employment situation described in the scenario above if you 
were a worker in this company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
I would be extremely              Neutral      I would be extremely 
dissatisfied with this             satisfied with this 
employment situation.            employment situation. 
 Scenario: 
 You are a worker in a company. You receive a wage which is fair for the type of work you do, this is 
paid to you weekly. 
 The company has shareholders who are the owners of the company, they receive a portion of any 
profit the company makes and can sell their shares for money. The value of their shares may increase if the 
company performs well, or decrease if the company performs badly. 
 In this company every individual worker also owns some shares in the company. In addition to a 
regular wage workers will therefore receive a portion of any profit the company makes the same as the other 
shareholders; the amount you receive depends on the number of shares you own. If the company does not 
make a profit you will still receive your regular wage, but no additional money. The value of your shares 
may increase or decrease depending on the performance of the company. Workers like you may buy and sell 
shares in the company as you please, to and from workers, other shareholders, or external parties. 
 Decisions regarding the operations of the company are made by management. Major decisions must 
gain approval of the shareholders; this includes the workers who own shares. Both shareholders and 
individual workers have a right to vote as they please on major company decisions. Information regarding 
the performance of the company is provided to both shareholders and workers such as yourself by 
management. You use this information to base your decisions on. 
 
1) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how just, or fair, do you believe that this 
type of employment arrangement is to workers in the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
     Very unfair.            Neither fair              Very fair. 
              nor unfair. 
 
2) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how committed do you believe you would 
feel towards the company, its goals, and its ongoing success if you were a worker here? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not committed at all              Neutral                        Completely 
to the company,                                    committed to the 
its goals, or success.                           company its goals 
       and success. 
 
3) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how would you rate your belief that you 
personally owned some of this company, i.e. would you see yourself as an owner of the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely not               Neutral     Most definitely 
an owner.                      an owner. 
 
4) How satisfactory would you find the employment situation described in the scenario above if you 
were a worker in this company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
I would be extremely              Neutral      I would be extremely 
dissatisfied with this             satisfied with this 
employment situation.            employment situation. 
 
 Please provide the following information before finishing: 
 
Sex: Male / Female  (Please circle one). 
 
Age:   (Years). 
 
Primary occupation:            (Please indicate). 
 
 
Debrief. 
 
You have just completed a questionnaire for the study Employee Ownership and 
Preferences for Organisational Control. The information you have provided will be used to 
establish if there is any preference for different types of employee ownership scheme that 
could be potentially used in a real world organisation. Each scenario you have read describes 
a different type of employee ownership scheme. The questions asked after each scenario 
represent different psychological constructs that the researcher believes are related to an 
individual’s experience of an employee ownership scheme. 
The project is being carried out as a requirement for MSc Applied Psychology by Kim 
Fraser, who can be contacted at kfr24@student.canterbury.ac.nz, under the supervision of 
Prof. Simon Kemp, who can be contacted at simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz. They will be 
pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.  
If you no longer want to be a part of this study please indicate this to the researcher 
now and your questionnaire will not be added to the others collected. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Appendix C 
University of Canterbury.  Department of Psychology. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Employee Ownership and Preferences for Organisational Control. 
 
Please read the following note before completing this questionnaire.  
 
NOTE: You are invited to participate in the research project Employee Ownership 
and Preferences for Organisational Control by completing the following questionnaire. The 
aim of the project is to investigate individual preferences for organisational structure by 
employees in an employing organisation. 
The project is being carried out as a requirement for MSc Applied Psychology by Kim 
Fraser, who can be contacted at kfr24@student.canterbury.ac.nz, under the supervision of 
Prof. Simon Kemp, who can be contacted at simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz. They will be 
pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.  
 
The questionnaire is anonymous, and you will not be identified as a participant without 
your consent. 
 
You may withdraw your participation, including withdrawal of any information you 
have provided, until your questionnaire has been added to the others collected. Because 
it is anonymous, it cannot be retrieved after that.  
 
By completing the questionnaire it will be understood that you have consented to 
participate in the project, and that you consent to publication of the results of the 
project with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved. 
 
Instructions: 
On the next page is an introduction. After reading these instructions please read the 
introduction carefully and then continue. On the pages following the introduction there are 
four scenarios. Each scenario describes a different employment situation in a company. Each 
scenario is followed by four questions. Please read each scenario carefully. Then answer all 
four questions relating to the scenario you have just read before moving on to read the next 
scenario. Please indicate your response to each question by circling the number on the scale 
that best describes how you feel. Only one response per question is required. There are no 
right or wrong answers to the questions.  
 The introduction below applies to all the scenarios that appear on the following pages. 
Introduction 
You are a worker in a company. You receive a wage which is fair for the type of work 
you do, this is paid to you weekly. As a worker you are responsible for the tasks that are a 
part of your job and you make basic decisions regarding the performance of these tasks e.g. 
deciding how hard you will work, how best to carry out the tasks necessary to perform your 
job, and how dependable you will be as a worker – the same as any worker in any traditional 
type of job.  
The company also employs managers, the managers have more responsibility than 
workers and are better paid. The managers make decisions regarding the overall operation of 
the company, decisions such as: the scheduling of work, planning the inputs necessary to 
complete projects, and allocating work to the workers who are best suited to perform it. 
Managers are also responsible for the strategies that the company will pursue to be successful 
in the long term. 
 The company has shareholders who are the owners of the company. They own shares 
in the company and receive a portion of any profits the company makes (known as a 
dividend). The amount of dividend a shareholder is paid is based on the number of shares 
they own. Shareholders can also sell their shares for money. The value of the shares may 
increase if the company performs well, or decrease if the company performs badly. 
Major company decisions must gain the approval of the company’s shareholders. As 
owners of the company they have a right to vote to approve or disapprove these decisions. 
This enables the shareholders to exert some control over the company and protect the money 
that they have invested in their company shares. 
 In this company workers also own an allocation of shares. This means that in 
addition to your regular wage you will receive a portion of any profit the company 
makes. If the company performs well your shares may increase in value, but may 
decrease in value if the company performs badly. You may sell your shares if you leave 
the company. All shareholders, including workers, are provided with information 
regarding the financial performance of the company regularly. 
 
 
Please continue and remember this introduction when reading the scenarios that follow. 
 
 Scenario: 
 As explained previously, you are a worker in a company where you are responsible 
for the tasks that are a part of your job and you make basic decisions regarding the 
performance of these tasks. In this company there are also managers. Managers have more 
responsibility than workers and make decisions regarding the overall operation of the 
company and are responsible for longer term strategies. Workers such as you are not 
involved in making the types of operational or strategic decisions made by managers. 
In this company major decisions must gain the approval of the company’s 
shareholders as they have a right to vote to approve or disapprove these decisions. Workers 
like you are not included in this process of voting on major company decisions, even 
though you also own shares in the company. This is because the company shares owned by 
workers are a special type of share that do not include a right to vote. The purpose of the 
workers’ shares is to provide the financial benefits of share ownership to them, not to provide 
them with control over the company.  
Questions: 
1) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how just, or fair, do you believe that this type of 
employment arrangement is to workers in the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
     Very unfair.            Neither fair              Very fair. 
              nor unfair. 
 
2) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how committed do you believe you would feel 
towards the company, its goals, and its ongoing success if you were a worker here? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not committed at all              Neutral                        Completely 
to the company,                                    committed to the 
its goals, or success.                           company its goals 
       and success. 
 
3) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how would you rate your belief that you personally 
owned some of this company, i.e. would you see yourself as an owner of the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely not               Neutral     Most definitely 
an owner.                      an owner. 
 
4) How satisfactory would you find the employment situation described in the scenario above if you were a 
worker in this company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
I would be extremely              Neutral      I would be extremely 
dissatisfied with this             satisfied with this 
employment situation.            employment situation.
 
 Scenario: 
As explained previously, you are a worker in a company where you are responsible 
for the tasks that are a part of your job and you make basic decisions regarding the 
performance of these tasks. In this company there are also managers. Managers have more 
responsibility than workers and make decisions regarding the overall operation of the 
company and are responsible for longer term strategies.  
In this company workers also actively participate with the managers in decision 
making about the overall operation of the company. This means that workers are not just 
responsible for the tasks that are a part of their jobs, they are also involved in work related 
decisions that would traditionally be the sole responsibility of a manager. Through this 
involvement in managerial decision making workers are able to share their work-
related knowledge, help to improve the performance of the company, and provide a 
better workplace benefiting everyone in the company. This is known as participative 
management and is intended to encourage an open and cooperative relationship between 
management and workers by including workers in some company decision making. 
In this company major decisions must gain the approval of the company’s 
shareholders as they have a right to vote to approve or disapprove these decisions. Workers 
like you are not included in this process of voting on major company decisions, even 
though you also own shares in the company. This is because the shares that workers own 
are a special type of share that do not entitle workers to vote on major company decisions. 
The purpose of the workers’ shares is to provide the financial benefits of share ownership to 
workers, not to provide them with control over the company.  
Questions: 
1) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how just, or fair, do you believe that this type of 
employment arrangement is to workers in the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
     Very unfair.            Neither fair              Very fair. 
              nor unfair. 
 
2) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how committed do you believe you would feel 
towards the company, its goals, and its ongoing success if you were a worker here? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not committed at all              Neutral                        Completely 
to the company,                                    committed to the 
its goals, or success.                           company its goals 
       and success. 
 
 
Continued overleaf. 
  
 3) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how would you rate your belief that you personally 
owned some of this company, i.e. would you see yourself as an owner of the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely not               Neutral     Most definitely 
an owner.                      an owner. 
 
4) How satisfactory would you find the employment situation described in the scenario above if you were a 
worker in this company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
I would be extremely              Neutral      I would be extremely 
dissatisfied with this             satisfied with this 
employment situation.            employment situation. 
 
 
 Scenario: 
 As explained previously, you are a worker in a company where you are responsible 
for the tasks that are a part of your job and you make basic decisions regarding the 
performance of these tasks. In this company there are also managers. Managers have more 
responsibility than workers and make decisions regarding the overall operation of the 
company and are responsible for longer term strategies. Workers such as you are not 
involved in making the types of operational or strategic decisions made by managers. 
In this company major decisions must gain the approval of the company’s 
shareholders as they have a right to vote to approve or disapprove these decisions. The 
shares owned by workers are the same as the shares owned by the company 
shareholders so the workers are also involved in this process of approving major 
decisions. Workers therefore also have some control over the company the same as the other 
shareholders. The purpose of the workers’ shares is to provide the financial benefits of share 
ownership to workers, and as a consequence of this arrangement the workers’ shares also 
provide them with some control over the company. 
Questions: 
1) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how just, or fair, do you believe that this type of 
employment arrangement is to workers in the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
     Very unfair.            Neither fair              Very fair. 
              nor unfair. 
 
2) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how committed do you believe you would feel 
towards the company, its goals, and its ongoing success if you were a worker here? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not committed at all              Neutral                        Completely 
to the company,                                    committed to the 
its goals, or success.                           company its goals 
       and success. 
 
3) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how would you rate your belief that you personally 
owned some of this company, i.e. would you see yourself as an owner of the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely not               Neutral     Most definitely 
an owner.                      an owner. 
 
4) How satisfactory would you find the employment situation described in the scenario above if you were a 
worker in this company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
I would be extremely              Neutral      I would be extremely 
dissatisfied with this             satisfied with this 
employment situation.            employment situation. 
 Scenario: 
As explained previously, you are a worker in a company where you are responsible 
for the tasks that are a part of your job and you make basic decisions regarding the 
performance of these tasks. In this company there are also managers. Managers have more 
responsibility than workers and make decisions regarding the overall operation of the 
company and are responsible for longer term strategies. 
In this company workers also actively participate with the managers in decision 
making about the overall operation of the company. This means that workers are not just 
responsible for the tasks that are a part of their jobs, they are also involved in work related 
decisions that would traditionally be the sole responsibility of a manager. Through this 
involvement in managerial decision making workers are able to share their work-
related knowledge, help to improve the performance of the company, and provide a 
better workplace benefiting everyone in the company. This is known as participative 
management and is intended to encourage an open and cooperative relationship between 
management and workers by including workers in some company decision making. 
In this company major decisions must gain the approval of the company’s 
shareholders as they have a right to vote to approve or disapprove these decisions. The 
shares owned by workers in the company are the same as the shares owned by the other 
shareholders so the workers are also involved in this process of approving major 
decisions. Workers therefore also have some control over the company the same as the other 
shareholders. This is in addition to making decisions about tasks in their jobs, and 
participating with managers in operational decision making. The purpose of the workers’ 
shares is to provide the financial benefits of share ownership to workers, and as a 
consequence of this arrangement the workers’ shares also provide them with some control 
over the company. 
Questions: 
1) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how just, or fair, do you believe that this type of 
employment arrangement is to workers in the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
     Very unfair.            Neither fair              Very fair. 
              nor unfair. 
 
2) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how committed do you believe you would feel 
towards the company, its goals, and its ongoing success if you were a worker here? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not committed at all              Neutral                        Completely 
to the company,                                    committed to the 
its goals, or success.                           company its goals 
       and success. 
 
Continued overleaf. 
 3) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how would you rate your belief that you 
personally owned some of this company, i.e. would you see yourself as an owner of the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely not               Neutral     Most definitely 
an owner.                      an owner. 
 
4) How satisfactory would you find the employment situation described in the scenario above if you were a 
worker in this company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
I would be extremely              Neutral      I would be extremely 
dissatisfied with this             satisfied with this 
employment situation.            employment situation. 
 
 
 
 Please provide the following information before finishing: 
 
Sex: Male / Female  (Please circle one). 
 
Age:   (Years). 
 
Principle occupation:            (Please indicate). 
 University of Canterbury.  Department of Psychology. 
 
Debrief. 
 
You have just completed a questionnaire for the study Employee Ownership and 
Preferences for Organisational Control. The information you have provided will be used to 
establish if there is any preference for different types of employee ownership scheme that 
could be potentially used in a real world organisation. Each scenario you have read describes 
a different type of control structure within a company that has employee owners. The 
questions asked after each scenario represent different psychological constructs that the 
researcher believes are related to an individual’s experience of employee ownership. 
The project is being carried out as a requirement for MSc Applied Psychology by Kim 
Fraser, who can be contacted at kfr24@student.canterbury.ac.nz, under the supervision of 
Prof. Simon Kemp, who can be contacted at simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz. They will be 
pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.  
If you no longer want to be a part of this study please indicate this to the researcher 
now and your questionnaire will not be added to the others collected. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Appendix D 
University of Canterbury.            Department of Psychology. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Employee Ownership and Preferences for Organisational Control. 
 
Please read the following note before completing this questionnaire.  
 
NOTE: You are invited to participate in the research project Employee Ownership 
and Preferences for Organisational Control by completing the following questionnaire. The 
aim of the project is to investigate individual preferences for organisational structure by 
employees in an employing organisation. 
The project is being carried out as a requirement for MSc Applied Psychology by Kim 
Fraser, who can be contacted at kfr24@student.canterbury.ac.nz, under the supervision of 
Prof. Simon Kemp, who can be contacted at simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz. They will be 
pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.  
 
The questionnaire is anonymous, and you will not be identified as a participant without 
your consent. 
 
You may withdraw your participation, including withdrawal of any information you 
have provided, until your questionnaire has been added to the others collected. Because 
it is anonymous, it cannot be retrieved after that.  
 
By completing the questionnaire it will be understood that you have consented to 
participate in the project, and that you consent to publication of the results of the 
project with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved. 
 
Instructions: 
On the following pages there are four scenarios. Each scenario describes a different 
employment situation in a company. Each scenario is followed by four questions. Please read 
each scenario carefully. Then answer all four questions relating to the scenario you have just 
read before moving on to read the next scenario. Please indicate your response to each 
question by circling the number on the scale that best describes how you feel. Only one 
response per question is required. There are no right or wrong answers to the questions.  
 You work for a company where you are paid in part by a fixed weekly salary. The company is 
arranged so that workers also own some company shares. If the company is profitable then in addition to 
the weekly salary you are also paid a dividend, this is your share of the profit. The amount of dividend 
paid is variable. If the company makes a large profit then the dividend paid is large, if the profit is small then 
a small dividend is paid, and if the company makes no profit then no dividend is paid. 
Scenario 
 As a worker your total income is the amount of your fixed salary plus any dividend you are due. 
When the company is performing at an average level, you would expect 25% of your income to be earned 
from your fixed salary and 75% of your income to be from the dividend. This provides you with a fair 
income for the work you do. However, the amount of dividend you receive may be more or less than 75% 
depending on the performance of the company. 
 
1) In this situation how important would it be to you to be able to vote for or against major company decisions 
suggested by management? Voting would enable you to have some governance control over the company.  
Questions 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not important                 Neutral      Very 
at all.                  important.  
 
 
2) In this situation how important would it be to you to be able to participate with management in decision 
making surrounding the daily operation of the company? Participating in work related decisions would give you some 
operational control over the company.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not important                 Neutral      Very 
at all.                  important.  
 
 
3) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how just, or fair, do you believe that this type of 
employment arrangement is to workers in the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very unfair.            Neither fair              Very fair. 
              nor unfair. 
 
 
4) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how would you rate your belief that you personally 
owned some of this company, i.e. would you see yourself as an owner of the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely not               Neutral     Most definitely 
an owner.                        an owner. 
 
 
 You work for a company which is arranged so that workers all own company shares. As a worker 
you are paid in part a fixed weekly salary and in addition are also paid a dividend which is a share of any 
profit the company makes. The amount of dividend paid is variable. If the company makes a large profit 
then the dividend paid is large, if the profit is small then a small dividend is paid, and if the company makes 
no profit then no dividend is paid. 
Scenario 
The total amount of income you receive is the amount of your fixed salary plus any dividend 
payable to you. You would expect, when the company has an average level of performance, to receive 50% 
of your income from your fixed salary and 50% from the dividend. This provides you with a fair 
income for the work you do. However, the amount of dividend you receive may be more or less than 50% 
depending on the performance of the company. 
 
1) In this situation how important would it be to you to be able to vote for or against major company decisions 
suggested by management? Voting would enable you to have some governance control over the company.  
Questions 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not important                 Neutral      Very 
at all.                  important.  
 
 
2) In this situation how important would it be to you to be able to participate with management in decision 
making surrounding the daily operation of the company? Participating in work related decisions would give you some 
operational control over the company.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not important                 Neutral      Very 
at all.                  important.  
 
 
3) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how just, or fair, do you believe that this type of 
employment arrangement is to workers in the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very unfair.            Neither fair              Very fair. 
              nor unfair. 
 
 
4) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how would you rate your belief that you personally 
owned some of this company, i.e. would you see yourself as an owner of the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely not               Neutral     Most definitely 
an owner.                        an owner. 
 
 
  The company where you work is arranged so that workers all own some company shares. In this 
company you are paid in part a fixed weekly salary and also a dividend paid from any profit the 
company makes. The amount of dividend is variable. If the company makes a large profit then the dividend 
paid is large, if the profit is small then a small dividend is paid, and if the company makes no profit then no 
dividend is paid. 
Scenario 
 Your total income is the amount of your fixed salary plus any dividend payable to you from 
company profits. You would expect your total income to consist of 75% fixed salary and 25% dividend 
when the company is performing at an average level. This provides you with a fair income for the work you 
do. However, the amount of dividend you receive may be more or less than 25% depending on the 
company’s performance. 
 
1) In this situation how important would it be to you to be able to vote for or against major company decisions 
suggested by management? Voting would enable you to have some governance control over the company.  
Questions 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not important                 Neutral      Very 
at all.                  important.  
 
 
2) In this situation how important would it be to you to be able to participate with management in decision 
making surrounding the daily operation of the company? Participating in work related decisions would give you some 
operational control over the company.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not important                 Neutral      Very 
at all.                  important.  
 
 
3) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how just, or fair, do you believe that this type of 
employment arrangement is to workers in the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very unfair.            Neither fair              Very fair. 
              nor unfair. 
 
 
4) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how would you rate your belief that you personally 
owned some of this company, i.e. would you see yourself as an owner of the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely not               Neutral     Most definitely 
an owner.                        an owner. 
 
 
  You are a worker in a company where you earn a fixed weekly salary which is a fair income for 
the type of work you do. The company has share holders who own company shares. You do not own any 
company shares. Share holders are paid a dividend which is a share of any profit the company makes. The 
amount of dividend paid to share holders varies depending on how much profit the company makes. 
Scenario 
As you do not own any company shares you do not receive any dividend payments. You receive 
your fixed salary in full regardless of whether the company is profitable or not. 
 
1) In this situation how important would it be to you to be able to vote for or against major company decisions 
suggested by management? Voting would enable you to have some governance control over the company.  
Questions 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not important                 Neutral      Very 
at all.                  important.  
 
 
2) In this situation how important would it be to you to be able to participate with management in decision 
making surrounding the daily operation of the company? Participating in work related decisions would give you some 
operational control over the company.  
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not important                 Neutral      Very 
at all.                  important.  
 
 
3) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how just, or fair, do you believe that this type of 
employment arrangement is to workers in the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very unfair.            Neither fair              Very fair. 
              nor unfair. 
 
 
4) Considering the information given in the scenario above, how would you rate your belief that you personally 
owned some of this company, i.e. would you see yourself as an owner of the company? 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely not               Neutral     Most definitely 
an owner.                        an owner. 
 Please provide the following information before finishing: 
 
Sex: Male / Female  (Please circle one). 
 
Age:   (Years). 
 
Principle occupation:            (Please indicate). 
 University of Canterbury.             Department of Psychology. 
 
Debrief. 
You have just completed a questionnaire for the study Employee Ownership and 
Preferences for Organisational Control. The information you have provided will be used to 
establish if there is any preference for different types of employee ownership scheme that 
could be potentially used in a real world organisation. Each scenario you have read describes 
a different type of control structure within a company that has employee owners. The 
questions asked after each scenario represent different psychological constructs that the 
researcher believes are related to an individual’s experience of employee ownership. 
The project is being carried out as a requirement for MSc Applied Psychology by Kim 
Fraser, who can be contacted at kfr24@student.canterbury.ac.nz, under the supervision of 
Prof. Simon Kemp, who can be contacted at simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz. They will be 
pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.  
If you no longer want to be a part of this study please indicate this to the researcher 
now and your questionnaire will not be added to the others collected. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
